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Article 
The Impact of Student Assistance on the Granting and 
Service of Temporary Restraining Orders 
IAN AYRES, BRENDAN COSTELLO & ELIZABETH VILLARREAL  
Temporary Restraining Orders (“TROs”) provide victims of domestic 
violence temporary ex parte court-ordered protection against further abuse. 
Because the vast majority of TRO applications are filed pro se, legal and 
logistical hurdles often prevent deserving applicants from receiving the 
legal protection to which they are entitled. Chief among these hurdles is the 
fact that TROs do not go into effect until they are served on respondents, yet 
service rates are very low. 
In this Article, we study the factors that affect whether judges grant ex 
parte TRO applications and whether the TROs are subsequently served. In 
particular, we evaluate the impact of a program in New Haven, Connecticut, 
that uses law students to provide clerical, non-legal assistance to applicants. 
We find that applicants assisted by Yale Law School students are no more 
or less likely to have their applications granted, but that student assistance 
is associated with a double-digit percentage point increase in in-hand 
service. Factors that affect grant rates include gender, judge assignment, 
and various severity factors like police involvement. We confirm earlier 
evidence that service rates of TROs are exceptionally low, and we find that 
in-hand service rates are relatively lower for people of color. We conclude 
by proposing possible reforms to law school interventions and the TRO 
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The Impact of Student Assistance on the Granting and 
Service of Temporary Restraining Orders 
IAN AYRES,* BRENDAN COSTELLO** & ELIZABETH VILLARREAL*** 
INTRODUCTION 
Temporary Restraining Orders (“TROs”) are emergency civil orders that 
provide victims of family violence additional protection from violence or 
unwanted contact. TROs are one of the most important ways that the 
government has chosen to respond to the problem of domestic violence,1 and 
are one of the most common ways that people interact with the court system. 
At any given time, there may be as many as two million protective orders 
(including TROs and related or longer orders) in effect nationwide.2 As a 
 
* Oscar M. Ruebhausen Professor of Law and Deputy Dean, Yale Law School, ian.ayres@yale.edu. 
** J.D. Yale Law School, 2019, brendan.john.costello@gmail.com. This Article was written in a 
personal capacity and does not reflect the views of his employer. 
*** J.D. Yale Law School, 2019, ebv9@georgetown.edu. This Article was written in a personal 
capacity and does not reflect the views of her employer. 
The authors would like to thank Nancy Bauer and the entire Clerk’s Office at the New Haven 
Superior Court; Constance Frontis, Ming-Yee Lin, and Ellen Messali of the New Haven Legal Assistance 
Association; Superior Court Judge Erika M. Tindill; Barbara Bellucci and members of the Greater New 
Haven Domestic Violence Task Force; State Marshal Brian Mezick; Doretta Sweeney; various TRO 
Project Student Directors and Volunteers; Megan Stevenson and participants at the 14th Annual 
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies for their invaluable comments and contributions throughout the 
duration of this project; and Mallori D. Thompson, Cait Barrett, and the editors of the Connecticut Law 
Review for all of their hard work editing the Article. We are grateful to Pranjal Drall, Sean Foley, Alex 
Minore, Zachary Shelley, and Susan Wang for excellent research assistance. Yale’s Institutional 
Research Board determined that this study was exempt from review. Brendan was a director of the Yale 
Temporary Restraining Order Project during the course of this study. While TRO directors are financially 
supported by a fellowship from Equal Justice America (“EJA”) (disbursed via the New Haven Legal 
Assistance Association), Brendan was not compensated for the time spent performing this study, nor was 
EJA consulted or made aware of the study. A Web Appendix that includes additional figures, Connecticut 
Judicial Forms, and a Coding Guide, is cited throughout this paper and is available online at 
https://ianayres.yale.edu/articles-and-other-writing. The Web Appendix also includes the full versions of 
the six Figures in this paper, some of which this Article presents in a truncated form. A Web Widget, 
which illustrates the empirical results of this paper, and a public copy of the dataset and code are also 
available on the same website. Note that the public dataset is de-identified (some identifying variables 
are removed and applicant ages are rounded) and so point estimates and standard errors may differ 
slightly if models are run using that dataset compared to the published results which use the original 
dataset.  
1 Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help 
End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1503–04 (2008). 
2 There were 1.4 million protection orders registered in federal databases and 2.1 million in state 
databases in 2014. BECKI GOGGINS & ANNE GALLEGOS, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., STATE PROGRESS IN 
RECORD REPORTING FOR FIREARM-RELATED BACKGROUND CHECKS: PROTECTION ORDER 
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point of comparison, the National Center for State Courts estimates that 1.5 
million Americans serve on a jury each year.3 Many experts support this 
emphasis on the court system because they believe TROs are one of the most 
effective tools victims have for preventing further abuse.4 
Depending on the state and the type of protection issued, TROs may also 
be known as civil orders of protection, relief from abuse orders, no contact 
orders, or stay away orders. As the names suggest, orders vary by state and 
are customizable to the needs of the applicant.5 They usually enjoin another 
person (the “respondent”) from contacting or coming near the applicant, and 
may also give applicants temporary custody of their shared children, require 
the respondent to vacate a shared home, or compel the respondent to 
maintain mortgage, insurance, or child support payments.6 Importantly, 
TRO applications are often granted on an ex parte basis (without 
participation by the respondent), going into effect as soon as they are served 
 
SUBMISSIONS 1 (2016). Theoretically, these databases should have similar entries, so the real number 
may be higher or lower depending on how well the databases were maintained to eliminate expired orders 
and how consistently local law enforcement reported orders to federal offices. In 2016, the Connecticut 
Judicial Branch reported that 8,334 applicants filed for a restraining order in Connecticut. STATE OF 
CONN. JUD. BRANCH, QUARTERLY PROTECTIVE ORDER / RESTRAINING ORDER DATA THROUGH 
12/31/2016, https://www.jud.ct.gov/statistics/prot_restrain/Prot_Restrain_Order.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 
2020).  
3 HON. GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, CTR. FOR JURY 
STUD., THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2, 
https://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/5319/sos_exec_sum.pdf (last visited Oct. 
2, 2020). 
4 See TK Logan & Robert Walker, Civil Protective Order Effectiveness: Justice or Just a Piece of 
Paper?, 25 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 332, 343 (2010) (finding that civil protective orders were associated 
with a decrease in abuse); Victoria L. Holt, Mary A. Kernic, Marsha E. Wolf & Frederick P. Rivara, Do 
Protection Orders Affect the Likelihood of Future Partner Violence and Injury?, 24 AM. J. PREVENTIVE 
MED. 16, 21 (2003) (concluding that civil protection orders are associated with a decreased likelihood of 
both physical and nonphysical abuse); Matthew J. Carlson, Susan D. Harris & George W. Holden, 
Protective Orders and Domestic Violence: Risk Factors for Re-Abuse, 14 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 205, 219–
20 (1999) (finding that civil protective orders were associated with a decrease in police contact). But see 
Judith McFarlane, Ann Malecha, Julia Gist, Kathy Watson, Elizabeth Batten, Iva Hall & Sheila Smith, 
Protection Orders and Intimate Partner Violence: An 18-Month Study of 150 Black, Hispanic, and White 
Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 613, 616 (2004) (finding a similar reduction in threats of violence 
regardless of whether the applicant received a protection order); Stefanie Knowlton, Are Restraining 
Orders False Security?, USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2014, 8:18 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2014/09/07/domestic-violence-deaths-raise-questions-about-gaps/15260841/ (quoting an 
employee of a victim assistance division who said, “For some people [getting a restraining order is] more 
dangerous. Sometimes it makes people really angry . . . .”). 
5 Because nuances of restraining order law vary by state, this Article uses Connecticut (where its 
empirical analysis was conducted) as its reference point, and general references to application procedures 
or the effects of orders refer to Connecticut law. Still, there are many similarities in laws and procedures 
across states, and we believe that much of this Article’s analysis is widely applicable beyond Connecticut. 
6 See, e.g., Application for Relief from Abuse, JD-FM-223 (Rev. 1-18), available in the Web 
Appendix (allowing applicants in Connecticut to check off boxes to request common forms of relief or 
write in requests for custom forms of relief).  
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on the respondent,7 with a judge considering a longer-term order at a future 
hearing with both parties.8 Violating a restraining order is a criminal offense9 
in Connecticut, where our study took place, and is punishable by up to five 
years in prison.10 
To obtain effective protection, however, an applicant must first surpass 
several legal and logistical hurdles. Chief among these hurdles is service: an 
order must be served on the respondent before courts can hold further 
hearings or law enforcement can enforce the ex parte order.11 Victims of 
domestic violence “cite failure to accomplish service of process” as one of 
the main reasons they fail to follow through on their restraining order 
cases.12 The drafters of the Violence Against Women Act recognized this 
problem, conditioning federal funding on states providing applicants 
financial assistance with service in protective order cases.13  
These hurdles are compounded by the fact that the vast majority of 
applicants must navigate this process without the assistance of counsel: over 
90% of applicants in our study were self-represented.14 While states often 
provide funding to domestic violence nonprofits, such as the Connecticut 
Coalition Against Domestic Violence, such service providers handle tens of 
thousands of calls each year, are responsible for providing counseling and 
shelter, and may not have the expertise or the resources necessary to do 
hands-on advising about the legal process of obtaining or serving a 
restraining order.15 This problem is not just a Connecticut problem—court 
 
7 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(b) (2019). Applicants technically do not have to ask for temporary 
ex parte relief and can just request a hearing order. However, though we did not keep a precise count, in 
our review of over one thousand TRO applications for this study, we observed that as a practical matter 
almost all applicants ask for this additional protection. 
8 Id. In Connecticut, TROs last for fourteen days or only up to seven days if the respondent 
possesses guns. This shorter timeline was part of a legislative compromise wherein respondents would 
be required to turn in their guns if served with a TRO but would have an expedited hearing schedule. An 
Act Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence: Hearing on H.B. 5054 Before the Conn. Gen. Assembly S., 
Reg. Sess. 002124–25 (Conn. 2016) (statement of Sen. Kissel). Even if the judge denies the ex parte 
application, the applicant will almost always receive a hearing so she can argue for a longer-term 
restraining order, but she will not receive protection in the interim period. See infra Section II.B 
(discussing the four potential options a judge can order for a TRO application). 
9 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-223b (2019). 
10 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-35a (2019).  
11 See infra Section II.C (discussing service requirements for TRO applicants in Connecticut). 
12 Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of 
Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 12 n.51 (1999) (citing ADELE 
V. HARRELL, BARBARA SMITH & LISA C. NEWMARK, URB. INST., COURT PROCESSING AND THE EFFECTS 
OF RESTRAINING ORDERS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 30–32 (1993)). 
13 Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. § 10461(c)(1)(D); Epstein, supra note 12, at 12. 
14 See infra Part III. 
15 In 2016, the largely government-funded Connecticut Coalition Against Domestic Violence 
received 30,128 calls to its crisis hotline and counseled many of the people who called in. Its member 
organizations were active in running emergency shelters and providing counseling. It provided guidance 
for 29,005 victims related to family court matters, including filing for restraining orders. CONN. COAL. 
AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, COLLECTIVE IMPACT: 2015–2016 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2017), 
http://www.ctcadv.org/files/5414/8467/7396/2015-2016_annual_report_1.17.pdf. 
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systems all over the country struggle with how to give domestic violence 
victims the legal counseling they need to get a TRO, even as TROs have 
become the government’s central tool for domestic violence prevention.16 
One early solution to this under-staffing problem was to use law students 
in school-based domestic violence clinics as legal advocates for domestic 
violence victims.17 The number of domestic violence-focused clinics has 
grown significantly over the years. There are now more than fifty such 
clinics,18 and that number may continue to grow as law schools devote 
increased resources to experiential learning courses.19 Most law school 
domestic violence clinics do more than simply help applicants receive 
TROs; they often help their clients more holistically by, for example, 
assisting with divorce and child custody actions, too.20 Some evidence exists 
that these clinics, which provide individual attention and comprehensive 
services, reduce the rate of physical and psychological re-abuse.21 Still, the 
effectiveness of student-run clinics in general has been brought into question 
in recent years. One prominent randomized field experiment found that an 
offer of legal assistance by a Harvard Law School clinic led to no differences 
in outcomes, but considerable delays in decisions.22 
In this Article, we add to our understanding of the effectiveness of law 
student assistance by studying a unique non-clinic intervention in domestic 
 
16 Margret E. Bell & Lisa A. Goodman, Supporting Battered Women Involved with the Court 
System: An Evaluation of a Law School-Based Advocacy Intervention, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
1377, 1378–79 (2001).  
17 Id. at 1379. 
18 Public Interest Clinics, A.B.A. (July 9, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/center-pro-
bono/resources/directory_of_law_school_public_interest_pro_bono_programs/definitions/pi_pi_clinics/. 
19 ABA Standard 303 requires all law students to take at least six credit-hours of experiential courses 
in order to graduate. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF 
LAW SCHOOLS 2018–2019, at 16 (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ 
misc/legal_education/Standards/2018-2019ABAStandardsforApprovalofLawSchools/2018-2019-aba-
standards-rules-approval-law-schools-final.pdf. 
20 See, e.g., Beshar/Lehner Gender Violence Clinic, YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/studying-
law-yale/clinical-and-experiential-learning/our-clinics/besharlehner-gender-violence-clinic (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2020) (explaining the clinic represents clients in civil and criminal matters); Domestic Violence 
and Family Law Clinic, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/dept/clinical/clinics/family-and-
domestic-violence-law-clinic-lsc/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2020) (explaining the clinic assists clients with 
“divorce, domestic violence, paternity, child and spousal support, adoption, and guardianship”).  
21 One small 2001 study with eighty-one low-income women in Washington, D.C., paired a group 
of participants with law students from Georgetown University or Catholic University of America law 
schools, supervised by faculty lawyers. The law students worked with those clients approximately six 
hours a week over six weeks. They assisted the clients with legal work, but also provided emotional 
support, referrals to community agencies, and help with safety planning. At the end of the study, only 
5% of the study participants who worked with law students reported physical re-abuse, compared with 
25% of the participants in the comparison group. Bell & Goodman, supra note 16, at 1385–94. 
22 D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: 
What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2118 (2012). 
See generally Jeanne Charn, Celebrating the “Null” Finding: Evidence-Based Strategies for Improving 
Access to Legal Services, 122 YALE L.J. 2206, 2220–22 (2013) (describing additional studies measuring 
the effect of legal representation in general on client outcomes). 
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violence cases. Yale Law School—although it also has a recently-founded, 
full-scale domestic violence clinic—has a long-standing program called the 
Yale TRO Project that takes a far more limited approach than traditional 
clinics do.23 At its conception in the mid-1980s, the TRO Project originally 
assisted applicants throughout the entire TRO application process, including 
filling out the application paperwork, getting the order served on the 
respondent, and representing the applicants at their subsequent hearings.24 
Over time, however, the Yale TRO Project has scaled back its approach.25 
Students no longer engage in full representation, but rather now provide much 
more limited clerical assistance and share general information with applicants, 
only assisting up until the point that the order is served on the respondent. 26  
Today, TRO Project volunteers assist applicants from an office in the 
New Haven Superior Court. They guide them through filling out the various 
forms that make up the TRO application. Students escort applicants to the 
Clerk’s Office, where the applications will be preliminarily processed. The 
students also inform applicants about the need to serve the judges’ orders—
whether the applicants received ex parte relief or not—and make follow-up 
calls to the applicants to remind them of the hearing to make sure that the 
orders are served promptly. The students do not attend the hearing with 
 
23 Each of the authors are former TRO Project volunteers: Ian Ayres was a volunteer in 1985–86 
when the TRO Project still partnered with practicing lawyers to represent TRO applicants at their 
hearings. Brendan Costello was a volunteer from 2016–19 and a Director of the TRO Project from 2017–
19. Elizabeth Villarreal was a volunteer in 2018. 
24 Gary Brown, Karin A. Keitel & Sandra E. Lundy, Comment, Starting a TRO Project: Student 
Representation of Battered Women, 96 YALE L.J. 1985, 1986–88 (1987). This model is still in place in 
New York City. Law students at local law firms and law schools partner with lawyers to represent clients 
through the entire TRO process. See, e.g., Brenna Rabinowitz, Funding for the Courtroom Advocates 
Project is Under Threat: Why it Matters, SANCTUARY FOR FAMILIES, https://sanctuaryforfamilies.org/c
ourtroom-advocates-project-under-threat (last visited Apr. 21, 2021) (noting that the program has trained 
and supervised over 12,000 advocates since 1997, mostly law students); Courtroom Advocates Project 
Turns 20, PATCH, https://patch.com/new-york/new-york-city/courtroom-advocates-project-turns-20 (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2021) (describing how lawyers take over client matters from law student volunteers if 
cases become contested); Domestic Violence Advocacy Project, NYU L., https://www.law.nyu.edu/stud
entorganizations/dvap (last visited Apr. 21, 2021) (listing the Courtroom Advocates Project as an NYU 
Law student group). 
25 Today, New Haven Legal Assistance Association attorneys help supervise the TRO Project 
Student Directors and train new volunteers. While they do not directly supervise the student interactions 
with each applicant, students are able to contact lawyers from New Haven Legal Assistance by phone if 
they need help with assisting an applicant. Lawyers are able to provide legal advice directly to applicants 
when necessary, and more complicated cases can be referred for possible representation by New Haven 
Legal Assistance lawyers or students in the full-scale clinic at Yale Law School that they supervise. 
Student Directors and volunteers also work closely with the Clerk’s Office at the New Haven courthouse, 
which usually participates in the training of the student volunteers and provides guidance and directives 
involving the application process and courthouse operations. 
26 Note that the Superior Court Rules in the Connecticut Practice Book provide an explicit exception 
to its prohibition on unlicensed practice for “[p]roviding clerical assistance to another to complete a form 
provided by a court for the protection from abuse, harassment and violence when no fee is charged to do 
so.” CONN. PRAC. BOOK R. SUP. CT. § 2-44A(b)(5) (2019). Further, the rules are careful to note that the 
prohibition will not limit “the ability of a person or entity to provide information of a general nature 
about the law and legal procedures to members of the public.” Id. at § 2-44A(d). 
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applicants or help with any other legal challenges they might be facing. 
The Yale TRO Project appears to be fairly unique in the domestic 
violence law school clinic space in its combination of limited scope of 
assistance and large-scale presence at the courthouse. In the fall of 2018, 
fifty-three students volunteered through the program, which is just under 
10% of the Yale Law School student body.27 Because of high volunteer 
turnover, a much larger percentage than that volunteer at some point during 
law school. In addition, the Yale TRO Project’s work is complemented by 
volunteers from the nearby Quinnipiac Law School. The Quinnipiac 
students provide similarly limited services, but, because they receive 
fellowship funding, are fewer in number and commit to a larger number of 
volunteer hours each.28 
The general ideas of limited representation and non-legal assistance are 
not unique, however, because both strategies can potentially offer assistance 
to more people at lower costs.29 And there is an appetite for providing these 
programs in the domestic violence area: a new federal law even requires 
chief judges to host an event at least once a year to promote pro bono legal 
services for domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking victims.30 We ask 
how effective the Yale TRO Project’s scaled-back intervention is and how 
the project’s effectiveness might be improved.31 To do so, we present an 
empirical study of TRO applications filed in the Judicial District of New 
Haven.32 The New Haven Judicial District incorporates a diverse range of 
towns, including the City of New Haven, the third largest city in 
Connecticut, and several smaller, wealthier suburbs. The study analyzed 
over one thousand applications from a period of a little over a year, from 
 
27 Data provided by the TRO Project student board.  
28 Fellowship Program, YALE SAPPERN MEM’L FUND, http://yalesappern.info/sappern-fellowship-
program/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2020).  
29 See generally James G. Mandilk, Note, Attorney for the Day: Measuring the Efficacy of In-Court 
Limited-Scope Representation, 127 YALE L.J. 1828, 1834–40 (2018) (surveying the rise of limited-scope 
representation). 
30 Pro Bono Work to Empower and Represent Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-237, § 3(a), 132 Stat. 
2447, 2448 (2018) (“[T]he chief judge . . . for each judicial district shall lead not less than one public 
event . . . promoting pro bono legal services as a critical way in which to empower survivors of domestic 
violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking and engage citizens in assisting those survivors.”). 
31 In undertaking this study, we are building on an existing body of writing on the TRO Project and 
TROs in New Haven generally, including by former TRO project volunteers. See generally Brown et al., 
supra note 24; Gary Richard Brown, Battered Women and the Temporary Restraining Order, 10 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 261 (1988); Molly Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, Do Restraining Orders Help? 
Battered Women’s Experience with Male Violence and Legal Process, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE 
CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 245 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., Auburn House 
1992); and Ming-Yee  Lin, Domestic Violence Restraining Orders: Procedural Challenges in New Haven 
(Spring 2013) (unpublished manuscript).  
32 The Judicial District of New Haven is made up of about half of the towns in New Haven County 
and includes the towns of Bethany, Branford, Cheshire, East Haven, Guilford, Hamden, Madison, 
Meriden, New Haven, North Branford, North Haven, Wallingford, and Woodbridge. See CONN. JUD. 
BRANCH STATS./REPS., TOWNS WITHIN JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS, 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/statistics/JD_GA.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2020).  
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September 2017 until January 2019. Our observational study emulates a 
randomized experiment, as we show that applicants in our dataset who were 
“treated” with Yale assistance are observationally similar to control-group 
applicants who did not receive such assistance. 
We find that applicants assisted by law students are no more or less 
likely to receive ex parte TROs than other applicants. However, we see 
substantial evidence that applicants assisted by Yale law students 
systematically reported more information in their TRO applications, 
including the presence of various “severity factors” in their affidavits. This 
may suggest a sorting effect: increased information disclosure may allow 
courts to better distinguish between meritorious applications and those that 
fall below the legal standard, even as overall grant rates remain constant.33 
Most importantly, we find that assistance from Yale students is associated 
with a double-digit increase in the probability that an order is subsequently 
served in-hand. Because TROs are not effective until served, we can 
conclude that student assistance is associated with an increased likelihood 
of a pro se applicant receiving effective TRO protection. 
In addition to student assistance, our analysis reveals insights about the 
granting and service of TROs more generally. We find, for example, that 
socioeconomic variables are important predictors of TRO outcomes. Gender 
is an important factor in TRO grants—applicants filing against men are most 
likely to be granted ex parte relief—but gender did not affect service rates. 
On the other hand, race is one of the strongest predictors of successful 
service—white applicants receive much higher in-hand service than 
applicants of other races—but race does not appear to affect grant rates. We 
also discover significant variation in the TRO grant rate across judges, even 
when controlling for differences in the applications the judges review. 
Finally, we identify certain “severity factors” that seem to matter in TRO 
grants: police involvement, weapon use, and hospitalization. 
Overall, our study reveals that significant hurdles remain for pro se 
applicants attempting to obtain the protection of restraining orders. Using 
our evaluation of the Yale TRO Project, we suggest ways that student 
assistance—and limited scope legal interventions generally—can be 
improved. This analysis may be particularly important in the age of 
COVID-19, where, despite reported increases in domestic violence,34 
 
33 See Lin, supra note 31 (making a similar sorting argument). 
34 See Babina Gosangi, Hyesun Park, Richard Thomas, Rasul Gujrathi, Camden P. Bay, Ali Raja, 
Steven E. Seltzer, Marta Chadwick Balcom, Meghan L. McDonald, Dennis P. Orgill, Mitchel B. Harris, 
Giles W. Boland, Kathryn Rexrode & Bharti Khurana, Exacerbation of Physical Intimate Partner 
Violence During COVID-19 Pandemic, 298 RADIOLOGY E38 (2021), https://pubs.rsna.org/doi/pdf/10.1 
148/radiol.2020202866 (reporting higher incidence and severity of physical intimate partner violence 
during the COVID-19 pandemic than the prior three years); Jesse Leavenworth, Connecticut Police See 
An Increase in Domestic Violence Calls During Coronavirus Stay-at-Home Orders, HARTFORD COURANT 
(Apr. 14, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-news-coronavirus-domestic-
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restrictions on in-person contact and courthouse availability may hamper 
traditional assistance methods35 and call for a reevaluation of what effective 
domestic violence assistance looks like.  
Our results also underscore the stark reality of TRO service: over one-
third of ex parte TROs and hearing orders are never served at all. We suggest 
several ways to reform the service process, including carrot-and-stick 
incentives for greater in-hand service and a belt-and-suspenders approach 
that utilizes some combination of certified mail and cell phone service. 
Finally, we propose the creation of a website that applicants—and their 
agents, including perhaps law students—can monitor in real time to ensure 
service and assist in safety planning. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we describe 
the problem of domestic violence, both in Connecticut and nationally, and 
discuss how TROs came to be one of the leading methods for combatting it. 
In Part II, we detail the TRO application process in New Haven, Connecticut. 
Part III gives our methodology, and Part IV presents our results. Finally, in 
Part V, we evaluate the efficacy of clerical assistance programs for domestic 
violence victims and discuss possible reforms to the TRO process. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND TROS AS 
A RESPONSE 
Domestic violence is a significant problem in the United States. 
Between 2003 and 2012, domestic or family violence made up 21% of all 
violent crime.36 Approximately one in four women and one in seven men 
report experiencing at least one incident of severe physical violence from 
their partners in their lifetime.37 Intimate partner violence alone, not 
counting other kinds of domestic violence, costs $5.8 billion dollars each 
year in direct medical care and lost productivity.38  
Under Connecticut law, TROs are available to family or household 
members who have been “subjected to a continuous threat of present physical 
 
violence-20200414-d2tl4yxuunahlmziqi5a6zxpre-story.html (reporting a rise in domestic violence-
related calls to the Hartford Police Department, the Connecticut State Police, and other state agencies). 
35 See, e.g., Robert V. Wolf, In Practice: Courts Respond as COVID-19 Fuels Rise in Domestic 
Violence, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION (Apr. 2020), https://www.courtinnovation.org/publications/courts-
covid-dv (describing various jurisdictions’ approaches to providing domestic violence legal services 
during the pandemic).  
36 BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 244697, NONFATAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
2003–2012, at 1 fig.1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndv0312.pdf. 
37 Matthew J. Breiding, Sharon G. Smith, Kathleen C. Basile, Mikel L. Walters, Jieru Chen & 
Melissa T. Merrick, Prevalence and Characteristics of Sexual Violence, Stalking, and Intimate Partner 
Violence Victimization – National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, United States, 2011, 63 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 9–10 (2014), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6308.pdf.  
38 NAT’L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., COSTS 
OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2003), https://www.cd
c.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/IPVBook-a.pdf.  
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pain or physical injury, stalking or a pattern of threatening . . . .” 39 Family or 
household members are statutorily defined as spouses or former spouses, 
parents, children, other relatives, roommates, parents of a child in common, or 
someone with whom the victim has a current or former dating relationship.40 
TROs are not the only type of order available to abuse victims, but they 
are the most accessible.41 Applicants in Connecticut, since 2015, have the 
option to apply for a civil protective order, which can be ordered against 
people who do not fit into the “family violence” categories.42 However, they 
are only available to victims of sexual abuse or stalking, not other types of 
abuse.43 In addition, criminal courts can issue criminal protective orders to 
protect victims during criminal proceedings and after convictions.44 
Notably, Connecticut’s family violence definition is broader than 
traditional definitions of intimate partner violence—which are limited to 
people in romantic or sexual relationships—and includes any kind of 
violence in the home between related or even merely cohabitating people.45 
Despite the broader “family violence” context that TROs are meant to 
address, many people still think of TROs as being primarily for intimate 
partner violence victims—or in more dated parlance, “battered women.” The 
Yale TRO Project, for example, when originally founded in 1984, was called 
the “Yale TRO Project for Battered Women.”46 An article written by some 
of its early volunteers had to reassure readers that “[b]attering of men by 
women does exist, although its frequency is difficult to measure.”47 
This framing is understandable; women were and still are at a 
disproportionate risk of violence. According to the CDC’s National Intimate 
Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, 25.1% of women in the United States—
about thirty million—have “experienced contact sexual violence, physical 
violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner” that was severe enough to 
impact their life in some way, including being concerned for their safety, 
needing legal or medical services, contacting law enforcement, or missing 
 
39 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(a) (2019); see also JD-FM-137, available in the Web Appendix. 
Note that in general, verbal abuse is not considered “family violence” in Connecticut unless it represents 
a likely threat of physical violence. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(a) (2019). 
40 Id. § 46b-38a(2); see also JD-FM-137, available in the Web Appendix. 
41 See id. §§ 46b-16a, 46b-38c, 53a-40e (authorizing civil protective orders and criminal protective 
orders). 
42 Id. § 46b-16a(a). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. §§ 46b-38c, 53a-40e(a). The offender still must be related to the victim or a member of her 
household, and, since the orders are made by a criminal judge, the state must be pursuing a criminal case 
against the offender. 
45 The CDC defines intimate partner violence as “physical violence, sexual violence, stalking, or 
psychological harm by a current or former partner or spouse.” Intimate Partner Violence, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/i
ndex.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2020).  
46 Brown et al., supra note 24, at 1985. 
47 Id. at 1985 n.2. 
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work.48 That compares to about 10.9% of men, or 12.1 million, who reported 
a similar experience.49 In Connecticut in 2016, twelve people were killed as 
a result of intimate partner violence—eleven women and one man.50 Three 
were from the New Haven area.51 
Despite this historical framing of “family violence” as a women’s issue, 
the general public seems increasingly aware that TROs are available to 
people in diverse gendered pairings and relationship types. In our study, 
although a woman in a current or former relationship with the respondent 
was the single most common demographic profile for applicants, male 
applicants accounted for 26.4% of all the TRO applications filed.52 TRO 
applicants were roommates or family members of the respondent—and not 
in a current or former intimate relationship—35% of the time.53 Applicants 
ranged from one to ninety-one years old.54 
On first impression, the existence of TROs as a widespread violence 
prevention technique can seem puzzling in that TROs appear merely to 
forbid respondents from engaging in activity that is already criminalized.55 
For the women’s rights advocates who originally pushed for widespread 
access to TROs, this prophylactic protection was necessary given the 
country’s enmeshed patriarchal values and de facto acceptance of domestic 
violence.56 For much of American history, spousal abuse was unindictable.57 
Police officers, like others in the justice system, often believed that families 
deserved privacy from government interference, even at the expense of an 
abused wife and children.58 Later, even police officers who were 
theoretically willing to involve themselves in domestic violence cases 
sometimes hesitated to arrest abusive spouses because they knew domestic 
violence victims sometimes ended up unwilling or unable to go through with 
a lengthy criminal process.59 Connecticut’s original TRO statute was passed 
 
48 NAT’L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2015 DATA BRIEF – UPDATED 
RELEASE 7–8 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/2015data-brief508.pdf. 
49 Id. at 9. For this reason, this Article sometimes uses female pronouns when referring to applicants, 
although we are aware that people of any gender experience family violence, and people who do not 
identify as female may face unique barriers to accessing courts and other services. 
50 CONN. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2017–2018 REPORT OF THE CONNECTICUT 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITY REVIEW TASK FORCE 3 (2018), http://www.ctcadv.org/files/3615/392
6/6889/2017-2018_DVFR_report_10.18.pdf. 
51 Id. 
52 See full summary statistics in the Web Appendix at Figure A1. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Of course, restraining orders may also prohibit respondents from having contact with applicants 
and criminal violation of a restraining order could result in steeper criminal punishment than the 
underlying crime would otherwise result in. 
56 Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 983–84 (1991). 
57 Brown, supra note 31, at 262. 
58 Schneider, supra note 56, at 985. 
59 Brown, supra note 31, at 263. 
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in 1981, five years after Pennsylvania became the first state to pass one.60 
There are now thousands of arrests relating to family violence a year. In 
2017, 16,662 family violence incidents, involving 14,983 victims and 
13,846 offenders, were reported in the state.61 
Connecticut’s TRO statute has been amended several times since the 
1980s, including in 2016, when the legislature passed a law requiring gun 
owners to give up their guns within twenty-four hours of being served with 
a TRO in a case involving use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force.62 Before that amendment, gun owners were only required to turn over 
their guns after the TRO was finalized into a restraining order at a hearing.63 
Because gun ownership is generally protected by the Second Amendment, 
Connecticut legislators felt that people who had their guns removed from 
them ex parte were entitled to a faster opportunity to be heard.64 Before 2016, 
all hearings were scheduled within fourteen days of an application being 
filed.65 Since 2016, cases where the application indicates that a respondent 
has guns have their hearings scheduled within seven days.66 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE TRO APPLICATION PROCESS AND MAJOR HURDLES 
FOR PRO SE APPLICANTS 
Applying for a TRO is a multi-step process that can take applicants 
hours, or even days, to complete. For the purposes of this paper, we have 
divided the process of applying for a TRO in New Haven into four steps: (1) 
accessing the court system and writing the TRO application; (2) filing the 
TRO and receiving a decision; (3) contacting a state marshal and getting the 
TRO served on the respondent; and (4) attending the hearing.67 
 
60 Id. at 261; 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10182–90 (West 2020) (repealed 1990). 
61 DORA B. SCHRIRO, CONN. DEP’T OF EMERGENCY SERVS. & PUB. PROT., CONNECTICUT FAMILY 
VIOLENCE 2017 ARREST REPORT 1 (2018).  
62 An Act Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence, Pub. L. No. 16-34, sec. 7, § 29-36k(b), 2016 
Conn. Acts 257, 264 (Reg. Sess.). Failing to do so could result in a felony charge for criminal possession 
of a firearm under state law. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-217(a)(4). 
63 Mark Pazniokas, House Conservatives Lose Battle to Block Domestic Violence Law, CT MIRROR 
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://ctmirror.org/2016/04/28/house-conservatives-lose-battle-to-block-domestic-
violence-law/.  
64 An Act Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence: Hearing on H.B. 5054 Before the Conn. Gen. 
Assembly S., Reg. Sess. 002124–25 (Conn. 2016) (statement of Sen. Kissel). 
65 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(b) (2020) (amended by An Act Protecting Victims of Domestic 
Violence, Pub. L. No. 16-34, 2016 Conn. Acts 257, 258–59 (Reg. Session)).  
66 Id. 
67 We describe the procedures as they were at the time of data collection. Some procedures have 
been temporarily updated in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Procedure for the Remote Filing 
of Temporary Restraining Orders and Civil Protection Orders, CONN. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://jud.ct.gov/remote_restrain.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2021) (providing information on how to file 
a TRO remotely). 
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A. Accessing the Court System and Writing the TRO Application 
Applicants come to the New Haven courthouse to apply for a TRO in a 
variety of ways. Anecdotally, applicants seem to commonly hear about 
TROs through word of mouth, from a domestic violence organization,68 
through online research,69 and through police recommendations.70 Only a 
small minority are represented by counsel.71 Once at the courthouse, 
applicants are sent by the Clerk’s Office front desk employees to the Yale or 
Quinnipiac offices for assistance filling out the TRO application 
paperwork—if the offices are open.72 On days that both offices are open, 
clients sort themselves between the offices, usually depending on whether 
one office is busy or not.73 If the offices are not open, applicants will receive 
only minimal assistance from the Clerk’s Office. Some applicants, especially 
if they cannot write in English, will receive some assistance from the Court 
Service Center, primarily in the form of translation and transcription.74  
When applying for a TRO, there are at least three forms every applicant 
must fill out.75 The overarching goal of these forms is to collect enough 
information to evaluate whether the applicant meets the statutory 
requirement for issuing a TRO, namely that there is “an immediate and 
 
68 For example, applicants may have heard about TROs from one of the CCADV’s eighteen member 
organizations, who, collectively, counseled 29,005 victims on family court matters including whether to 
obtain a TRO. CONN. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 15, at 4–5. 
69 The website CTLawHelp, with content produced by Connecticut Legal Services, Greater 
Hartford Legal Aid, New Haven Legal Assistance Association, and Statewide Legal Services of 
Connecticut, gives detailed instructions for how to obtain a TRO in Connecticut. How to Apply for a 
Restraining Order, CTLAWHELP (May 2020), https://ctlawhelp.org/en/restraining-protective-order. The 
Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Libraries also contains a comprehensive web page with links to the 
relevant statutes, reports, application instructions, and even self-help videos. Connecticut Law About 
Domestic Violence, CONN. JUD. BRANCH L. LIBRS., https://www.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/Law/domesticviolen
ce.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2021). 
70 During the coding process, the authors came across many applications where the applicant 
referenced that the police had advised them that they should seek a TRO. 
71 In our study, we coded only 6.3% as likely represented by lawyers. See Web Appendix Table A1. 
72 It is possible that some applicants come fully prepared with forms already filled out and are able 
to file without any use of the Yale or Quinnipiac office even on days that they are open, but our 
conversations and experiences with the Clerk’s Office suggests that they generally still request that these 
pro se applicants visit one of these offices to check over their forms before filing. 
73 The offices are both on the fifth floor of the courthouse. The Quinnipiac office appears directly 
in front of the elevators, and a small sign on a nearby board announces that the Yale office is down the 
hall. Because Quinnipiac also assists with divorces, they also could see different types of applicants who 
are more likely to be getting divorced from their partner. We address concerns that applicants might be 
non-randomly sorting themselves into the Yale office infra Part IV. 
74 “Court Service Centers provide services for self-represented parties, members of the bar, and the 
community at large. They are located within Judicial District Courthouses and are staffed by Judicial 
Branch employees trained to assist all court patrons. Several Court Service Centers have bilingual staff.” 
Court Service Centers, CONN. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.jud.ct.gov/CSC/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2020). 
75 See Family Forms: Filing an Application for a Restraining Order, CONN. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/forms/grouped/family/restraining_order.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2020) (listing 
the forms needed to file for a TRO).  
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present physical danger to the applicant.”76 First, applicants must complete 
Form 137, which collects various pieces of demographic information about 
the respondent and applicant, including the type of relationship between the 
two and if they have any minor children that the applicant also wants 
protected.77 Form 137 also asks the applicant whether the parties have a 
history of family court actions or previous restraining orders, if the 
respondent possesses any guns, and what protection the applicant wants.78 
After supplying this basic information, the applicant must also complete 
Form 138, which asks the applicant to write an affidavit that describes in her 
own words why she believes she is in “immediate and present physical 
danger.”79 This is a particularly important part of the application process, and 
one on which the law student volunteers focus a large part of their time, while 
avoiding unauthorized practice of law. Unlike attorneys, students in the Yale 
TRO office do not write affidavits for applicants, nor do they dictate any 
portion or advise applicants whether or not to include particular aspects of 
their stories. Students do, however, invite applicants to tell their stories orally 
and are active listeners—asking questions when something seems vague, 
unclear, or confusing. By doing so, students provide a dry-run for applicants 
to tell their stories in their own words and to remember details that may be 
helpful when they eventually write—on their own—the text of their affidavits.  
Students also provide general information on what is useful for 
applicants to include in their affidavits and relay advice that judges have 
asked them to pass on. For example, judges in New Haven have emphasized 
to law student volunteers that applicants should write their affidavits in 
reverse chronological order and include specific dates and exact quotes.80 
Those suggestions are not listed on the affidavit form, which asks the 
applicant to “include a statement of the conditions you seek relief from,” and 
to explain “(1) what happened, (2) when it happened, (3) where it happened, 
and (4) who was there when it happened.”81 
Third, applicants fill out a State Marshal Commission Protection Order 
Service Respondent Profile Form, which tells the state marshals, who will 
be charged with serving the eventual TRO or hearing order to the respondent, 
information about the respondent’s address, respondent’s appearance, and 
 
76 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(b) (2019). 
77 See form in the Web Appendix. 
78 See form in the Web Appendix. Applicants have the option of describing custom protection that 
they want, but the form also suggests pre-drafted orders such as: “The Respondent not assault, threaten, 
abuse, harass, follow, interfere with, or stalk me.”; “The Respondent stay away from my home or 
wherever I shall reside.”; and “The Respondent not contact me in any manner, including by written, 
electronic or telephone contact, and not contact my home, workplace or others with whom the contact 
would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to me.” 
79 See form in the Web Appendix. 
80 Lin, supra note 31, at 4.  
81 See form in the Web Appendix. 
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places where he can be commonly found.82 Marshals in Connecticut are 
independent contractors and sworn peace officers who serve civil processes, 
perform evictions, and sometimes execute capias warrants.83  
Some applicants, depending on their preferences and circumstances, 
also fill out a Request for Nondisclosure of Location Information (if the 
applicant does not wish to have her address known to the respondent), an 
Affidavit Concerning Children (which collects information about children 
and is generally used when the applicant is seeking temporary custody of 
children), and a Supplemental Affidavit and Request for Orders of 
Maintenance (if the applicant and respondent are married or they live 
together along with a dependent child and the applicant wants additional 
relief such as ongoing financial support or the return of personal effects).84 
Applicants assisted by Yale volunteers also fill out a waiver and additional 
clerical forms for TRO Project recordkeeping and follow-up. 
B. Filing the TRO and Receiving a Decision 
After the applicant has finished filling out the TRO application 
paperwork, she will bring her completed forms to the Clerk’s Office where 
a staff member will check that the forms have been completed correctly and 
have the applicant swear an oath attesting that all of the statements made in 
the application are true to the best of the applicant’s knowledge. The staff 
member will then send the applicant to wait either outside the Clerk’s Office 
or near the courtrooms.  
While the applicant is waiting, the clerk will pull records related to any 
prior family court matters, including previous restraining orders. The clerk 
(or a student volunteer) will then take the completed application and any 
related court files to a family court judge. The particular judge assigned to 
hear the application rotates according to a pre-assigned schedule, in which a 
different judge is on call each week. The judge will review the application 
soon after she receives it, often during a break in other proceedings. A clerk 
will then approach the applicant, explain to her the judge’s decision, and 
direct her back to the Clerk’s Office to pick up a final version of the judge’s 
 
82 See Family Forms: Filing an Application for a Restraining Order, CONN. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/forms/grouped/family/restraining_order.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2020) (linking 
to Restraining Order Service Instructions, SMC-1, Rev. 10-15 and Restraining Order Service Respondent 
Profile, SMC-2, Rev. 10-15). 
83 Marshal Commission, State, CONN. ST. DEP’T ADMIN. SERVS., https://portal.ct.gov/DAS/Com
munications/Connecticut-State-Marshal-Commission/FAQ (last visited Sept. 30, 2020). Capias warrants 
are civil bench warrants issued for failure to appear. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-2a (2019). Note that these 
marshals are distinct from the court marshals who provide security in the courthouse. 
84 See Family Forms: Filing an Application for a Restraining Order, CONN. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/forms/grouped/family/restraining_order.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2020) (linking 
Affidavit Concerning Children, JD-FM-164 and Supplemental Affidavit and Request for Order of 
Maintenance, JD-FM-233); Request for Nondisclosure of Location Information, JD-FM-188, available 
at https://www.jud.ct.gov/webforms/forms/FM188.pdf. 
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order. The Clerk’s Office will type and finalize the judge’s order and enter 
the information into the computer system. 
The judge completely denies TRO applications extremely rarely, which 
we anecdotally saw in cases where the applicant asks for a TRO against 
someone who does not fall into the categories necessary for the allegations to 
constitute “family violence.”85 Instead, the judge will either grant or deny the 
ex parte temporary relief and, in almost all cases, schedule a follow-up hearing 
to decide whether the court should grant an order that can last for up to a year. 
The hearing must be scheduled within seven days if the applicant alleges that 
the respondent owns a gun or within fourteen days in all other cases.86 
Therefore, the possible options the judge can order based on the application 
forms are: (1) deny all requests for relief; (2) grant ex parte relief pending a 
hearing in seven days; (3) grant ex parte relief pending a hearing in fourteen 
days; or (4) deny ex parte relief but schedule a hearing in fourteen days.87 
Depending on a number of factors—including the complexity of the 
application, how busy the Clerk’s Office is, and whether the judge is on a 
lunch break when she receives the application—the entire process up until 
this point of an initial judicial decision can take several hours. If the applicant 
starts the process too late in the day for the judge to review it, or the applicant 
has to leave before the clerk can give her the order, she may have to return 
to the courthouse the following day to pick up the judge’s order.  
C. Contacting a State Marshal and Getting the TRO Served on the 
Respondent 
Once the applicant has picked up the order from the Clerk’s Office, she 
is responsible for giving the order to a state marshal so it can be served on 
the respondent within three days of the hearing.88 The requirement that 
orders be served on the respondent ensures that the respondent receives 
sufficient notice of the hearing to contest any court orders, and preserves his 
 
85 In our study, only about one percent of applications were outright denied. See Web Appendix 
Table A1. Our understanding is that this general policy of judges against outright denials stems at least 
in part from the 2015 case of Wendy V. v. Santiago, 125 A.3d 983 (Conn. 2015). Although the 
Connecticut Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the appeal as moot, a footnote in the opinion noted that 
the court was “perplexed as to why the trial court did not allow a hearing” on a TRO application “[g]iven 
the clear statutory directive that a hearing ‘shall’ occur.” Id. at 987 n.8. 
86 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(b) (2019). 
87 Id. § 46b-15(b)–(c). 
88 The restraining order statute commands that “[t]he applicant shall cause notice of the hearing . . . 
and a copy of the application and the applicant’s affidavit and of any ex parte order . . . to be served on 
the respondent not less than three days before the hearing.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(h)(1) (2019). 
Some have questioned whether it makes sense for applicants to be “burdened with the responsibility of 
getting a state marshal to serve [the orders].” Jeffrey Tebbs & Erika Tindill, Abusers Must Be Put on 
Notice, HARTFORD COURANT (Aug. 16, 2009). 
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constitutional rights.89 Restraining orders can require a respondent to vacate 
a shared home or restrict his movement, impinging on property or liberty 
interests protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.90 More generally, 
service also serves the function of ensuring that the court has personal 
jurisdiction over the respondent.91 In addition, service of an ex parte order is 
crucial for it to have any bite: a key element of criminal violation of a 
restraining order is that the defendant has “knowledge of the terms of the 
order.”92 Essentially, restraining orders are not effective until they are served 
on the respondent. 
In Part IV, we engage with the constitutional boundaries of effective 
service and consider whether various alternative methods of service for 
TROs would be permissible. Here, we describe how service is currently 
prescribed and accomplished in Connecticut. Precisely what service is 
adequate for restraining orders in Connecticut, however, is a complicated 
question. The restraining order statute is silent on the method of service 
except in two very limited circumstances. When an ex parte order is issued 
and the applicant alleges that the respondent has a firearm, “the proper 
officer responsible for executing service shall, whenever possible, provide 
in-hand service . . . .”93 In cases for which the applicant is seeking extension 
of an existing order and the respondent did not appear on the initial 
application, “service of a motion to extend an order may be made by first-class 
mail directed to the respondent at the respondent’s last-known address.”94  
Other than these two narrow exceptions, service is governed by 
Connecticut’s general statute for civil service of process: “Except as 
otherwise provided, process in any civil action shall be served by leaving a 
true and attested copy of it, including the declaration or complaint, with the 
defendant, or at his usual place of abode, in this state.”95 The text of the 
statute, therefore, implies that either in-hand or abode service should be 
sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s obligations.  
 
89 See Nadine Taub, Ex Parte Proceedings in Domestic Violence Situations: Alternative 
Frameworks for Constitutional Scrutiny, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 95, 127 (1980) (describing the equality, 
dignity, and participation values underlying traditional notice requirements for court proceedings). 
90 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Taub, supra note 89, at 128. 
91 See 1 DUPONT ON CONNECTICUT CIVIL PRACTICE § 8-1.2 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2020) (“The 
purpose served by a summons is not merely to provide notice to the defendant or respondent, but is also 
to establish the court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant as well.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
59b(a) (2019) (defining personal jurisdiction over nonresident individuals, foreign partnerships, and 
foreign voluntary associations per Connecticut practice). 
92 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-223b(a) (2019). 
93 Id. § 46b-15(h)(2). 
94 Id. § 46b-15(g). 
95 Id. § 52-57(a). Similarly, “[t]he service of a writ of summons shall be made by the officer reading 
it and the complaint accompanying it in the hearing of the defendant or by leaving an attested copy 
thereof with him or at his usual place of abode.” Id. § 52-54. Note the additional requirement that “[w]hen 
service is made by leaving an attested copy at the defendant’s usual place of abode, the officer making 
service shall note in his return the address at which such attested copy was left.” Id. 
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However, there is good reason to question whether abode service is 
sufficient for applicants to obtain protection as a practical matter. A leading 
treatise on Connecticut Civil Practice notes that while abode service is 
occurring “[w]ith increasing frequency” in a wide range of civil matters, “a 
round of dilatory pleadings is often commenced challenging abode 
service.”96 In certain cases, such as when the recipient lives in an apartment 
complex, “it is relatively easy to make a claim that [the service statute] was 
not followed.”97 Courts have thus engaged with highly fact-specific 
questions of when abode service was done in a satisfactory manner; service 
in a common apartment hallway, for example, has been considered to be 
insufficient.98 Still, an officer’s return is presumed correct, so the defendant 
has the burden of proving that service was insufficient.99 These service 
issues are unique to abode service;100 in-hand service “stills all argument.”101 
There is good reason to believe that these on-the-ground difficulties with 
abode service in general extend to the specific case of TROs. A 2015 report 
commissioned by the Connecticut legislature found that judges often dismiss 
cases in which only abode service was accomplished, and prosecutors may 
decline to bring charges for violating restraining orders where the respondent 
was not served in-hand.102 Even the legislature appears unclear about what 
level of service is required for TROs. During floor debate in 2016, multiple 
state senators made comments expressing their confusion and concern about 
the issue.103 Clearly there is good reason to believe that in-hand service, as 
 




100 This is true at least relative to in-hand service. Abode service, as an example of actual service, 
may still be harder to challenge than constructive service (such as mail) because the defendant bears the 
burden in actual service cases. Id. 
101 Id. 
102 TASK FORCE TO STUDY SERVICE OF RESTRAINING ORDERS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9–10 (2015) (“[T]he task force heard testimony that most judges in practice require orders to be in-hand, 
and more importantly, prosecutors will not go forward on a violation of restraining order case where 
there hasn’t been in-hand service or proof of service.”). 
103 See the following excerpts from floor debate: 
Senator Kissel: “My first question is, I just want to clarify, when the order, the 
initial temporary restraining order is served, does the bill before us allow both in-hand 
service and abode service?” . . .  
Senator Coleman: “The bill contemplates in-hand service ⁠.” 
. . .  
Senator Frantz: “[O]f particular concern is if I’m reading the bill correctly, a 
TRO can be served without actually physically seeing that person and handing it to 
this person. It can be dropped off at the doorstep. It can be dropped off in a mailbox. 
That doesn’t strike me as a very good system. Can you give the circle some assurance 
that a person who, as Senator Kissel says might be out of the country on a business 
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it currently stands, provides applicants the best chance to obtain practical 
protection, but abode service is frequently accepted as a sufficient basis. 
During our coding process, we found that a large number of the respondents 
served at their abodes came to the hearing. In these cases, judges may look for 
evidence that abode service led to timely actual notice or will ask respondents 
if they will waive proper service, to which respondents often agree.104 
Service is free for TRO applicants; the State of Connecticut pays 
marshals on a per-application basis when service is effected.105 If the 
applicant received ex parte relief, and the respondent has not received 
effective service three days before the scheduled hearing, she can file a 
Request for Additional Time for Service form with the court.106 Although 
judges are available to rule on TRO applications during business hours, 
marshals keep much more limited hours. An individual marshal is assigned 
on a rotating schedule to wait for applicants in the hallway outside the 
Clerk’s Office from 12:30 p.m. to 1:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
daily.107 That means that applicants may have to wait for several hours after 
they have received a TRO for the marshal to arrive at his assigned shift. Once 
the applicant locates the marshal, she hands him the Protection Order 
Service Respondent Profile form, which lists information about the 
 
trip for a week is after 24 hours of not receiving this now essentially a criminal because 
he hasn’t turned his guns in, or her guns in ⁠.” 
Senator Coleman: “I thank the good Senator for the question, and I think Senator 
Kissel posed a similar question. I’m not sure that I responded completely accurately. 
May the Chamber stand at ease for one moment.” ⁠ 
Senator Coleman: “I am informed that in-hand service is preferred but abode 
service is permitted in this bill, so I correct myself, and I apologize to Senator Kissel 
because I think my response to his question was a little different than what is actually 
the case ⁠.”  
. . .  
Senator Fasano: “[C]ould the Senator describe for me whether or not that order 
would be by the [sic] this bill proposed in hand or abode[?]” . . . 
Senator Coleman: “[T]he service of the order would be preferred to be, strongly 
preferred to be in hand, but in both services also permissible.” 
An Act Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence, Hearing on H.B. 5054 Before the Conn. Gen. Assembly 
S., Reg. Sess. 00217–18, 002131–32, 002173–74 (Conn. 2016). 
104 Interview with Judge Erika M. Tindill, Conn. Super. Ct., in New Haven, Conn. (Apr. 23, 2019). 
105 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 6-32, 52-261 (2019). 
106 Request for Additional Time for Service of Ex Parte Restraining Order, JD-FM-256, available 
at https://jud.ct.gov/webforms/forms/FM256.pdf; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(c) (2019) (“If the 
court issues an ex parte order pursuant to subsection (b) of this section and service has not been made on 
the respondent in conformance with subsection (h) of this section, upon request of the applicant, the court 
shall, based on the information contained in the original application, extend any ex parte order for an 
additional period not to exceed fourteen days from the originally scheduled hearing date.”). 
107 CONN. JUD. BRANCH, NEW HAVEN SUPERIOR COURT GUIDE (2009), https://www.jud.ct.gov/P
ublications/es213.pdf. 
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respondent, his location, and frequent whereabouts.108 Sometimes, the 
marshal will ask the applicant for additional information about the 
respondent and help her fill in incomplete sections of the form.  
Marshals are regulated by the State Marshal Commission, an executive, 
not judicial, branch of the Connecticut government.109 Marshals are 
independent contractors,110 not state employees. As such, they set their own 
hours and charge separately for every order served, with oversight from a 
State Marshal Commission.111 Serving TROs is a requirement for 
marshals,112 and fairly dissimilar to many of their other job functions. 
Normally, marshals maintain their own offices and work to develop 
relationships with private lawyers who will hire them for other service jobs. 
TROs are delivered for a statutory fee of no more than $60 paid by the 
Judicial Branch,113 and work is distributed equally to all marshals.  
The Clerk’s Office does not have a record of which marshal is 
attempting to serve which TRO until and unless a return of service is 
reported by a marshal.114 Likewise, although applicants usually hand the 
TRO to the marshal in person, they may not be told or remember which 
marshal is working on serving their order. It is the responsibility of the 
applicant to ask for the marshal’s name and contact information if she wants 
to follow up about service,115 something many applicants do not know to do. 
Marshals are not obligated to tell applicants when they have served the order, 
and without calling the marshals’ cell phones to ask, applicants may not know 
when the TROs have gone into effect. For this reason, one of the key benefits 
of legal assistance to applicants is monitoring the process to ensure that service 
is properly accomplished. A leading treatise notes that “[c]lose cooperation 
with the sheriff or other authority responsible for effecting service mandates 
that the lawyer or a skilled legal assistant monitor the file and make any 
necessary follow-up phone calls to [e]nsure that process has been served.”116  
 
108 See Family Forms: Filing an Application for a Restraining Order, CONN. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/forms/grouped/family/restraining_order.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2020) (linking 
to Restraining Order Service Instructions, SMC-1, Rev. 10-15 and Restraining Order Service Respondent 
Profile, SMC-2, Rev. 10-15). 
109 Marshal Commission, State, CONN. STATE DEP’T ADMIN. SERVS., https://portal.ct.gov/DAS/C
ommunications/Connecticut-State-Marshal-Commission (last visited Mar. 21, 2021). 
110 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6-38a (2019).  
111 See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6-38b (2019).  
112 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6-38b(f) (2019). 
113 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 6-32, 52-261 (2019). Marshals may also receive mileage for one trip 
only. See TASK FORCE TO STUDY SERVICE OF RESTRAINING ORDERS, supra note 102. See also CONN. 
SUPERIOR CT., HOW TO APPLY FOR A RESTRAINING ORDER UNDER SECTION 46B-15, JD-FM-247, 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/FM259.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2021) (indicating the Judicial 
Branch pays for the delivery fee). 
114 See Tebbs & Tindill, supra note 88 (observing that the system “leaves the Judicial Branch 
unaware of whether victims have retained a state marshal to serve the order”). 
115 CONN. SUPERIOR CT., supra note 113. 
116 1 DUPONT ON CONNECTICUT CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 91, at § 8-1.22. 
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The Yale TRO Office, but not the office staffed by Quinnipiac law 
students, puts considerable volunteer effort into calling applicants and 
reminding them to contact the marshal who has their TRO to ensure that 
service is completed. If the applicant did not get the name of the marshal 
who has her TRO, the volunteers will try to figure out the marshal’s name 
by checking the marshal assignment calendar, although the calendar 
sometimes has errors. Yale volunteers used to communicate with marshals 
directly117 but stopped doing so some time after 2013, which we understand 
to have been driven at least in part by some push-back from the marshals 
relating to student involvement in their work.  
D. Attending the Hearing 
On the day of the hearing, the applicant and respondent are each required 
to meet with a Family Relations Counselor from the Court Support Services 
Division prior to the hearing.118 The counselor separately interviews the 
applicant and respondent about any existing court orders, whether they 
possess a firearm or have a permit to do so, the history of the relationship, 
and any children they have in common.119 If possible, the counselor will 
attempt to broker a written agreement between the parties that would avoid 
the need for a hearing.120 The applicant and respondent are not forced to be 
in the same room with each other before the hearing.121 
At the end of the meeting, if the applicant and respondent have not 
reached an agreement, they attend the hearing in front of a family court 
judge. There, the applicant has the opportunity to explain to the judge why 
she believes she meets the standard necessary to receive a restraining order: 
that she has been “subjected to a continuous threat of physical pain or 
physical injury . . . by another family or household member . . . .”122 While 
hearings are somewhat informal and procedures may vary, in general the 
applicant and respondent will testify before the judge and the court may 
review evidence or hear from other witnesses. At the end of the hearing, the 
court decides, in its discretion, regardless of whether the applicant received 
an ex parte TRO, if she should receive a restraining order for a period of up 
to a year.123 The judge also decides what conditions should be part of the 
restraining order, including some child custody decisions.124  
 
117 Lin, supra note 31, at 10. 
118 Domestic Violence (Family Violence): Frequently Asked Questions, CONN. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/faq/DomViolence.htm#22 (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).  
119 STATE OF CONN. SUP. CT., RESTRAINING ORDERS: HOW TO APPLY FOR RELIEF FROM ABUSE, 
JDP-FM-142 (rev. Oct. 2016), https://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/fm142.pdf. 
120 Domestic Violence (Family Violence): Frequently Asked Questions, CONN. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/faq/DomViolence.htm#22 (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).  
121 Id. 
122 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(a) (2019). 
123 Id. § 46b-15(g) (2019). 
124 Id. § 46b-15(b) (2019). 
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As described above, proper service is a requirement for the court to have 
jurisdiction over the respondent.125 If the respondent was not served and does 
not know about the hearing, or was improperly served and does not waive 
the service requirement, the applicant will have to go back and try again to 
get service. On the request of an applicant who received an ex parte order, 
the court will provide a limited extension (in any case no more than 14 days) 
of the ex parte order while she attempts service again.126 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
In this Part, we describe our study’s methodology.127 We analyzed 1,273 
files,128 which was a little over a year’s worth of all of the TRO applications 
filed in the New Haven Superior Court from 2017 to January 2019. We chose our 
sample size to ensure that we had sufficient statistical power to be able to detect 
an effect of Yale treatment on our main outcome of interest: in-hand service.129 
From the restraining order application form,130 we recorded (1) the 
applicant and respondent’s respective date of birth,131 sex,132 and race; (2) 
whether there was previously a protective or restraining order involving 
either the applicant or the respondent; (3) whether the applicant and 
respondent have a previous or pending divorce, custody, or visitation action; 
(4) whether the applicant wants the TRO to also protect her minor children;133 
 
125 “The applicant shall cause notice of the hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of this section and a 
copy of the application and the applicant’s affidavit and of any ex parte order issued pursuant to 
subsection (b) of this section to be served on the respondent not less than three days before the hearing.” 
Id. § 46b-15(h)(1) (2019). 
126 Id. § 46b-15(c). 
127 More specific information about our methodology can be found in the coding guide in the 
Web Appendix. 
128 Of these 1,273, we were not able to locate twenty-nine of the files in the courthouse file room, 
so they were excluded from our study. 
129 We chose 80% power and p=.05 as thresholds, leaving a question of how small an effect size 
we wanted to ensure that we had power to detect. To get a sense of what portions of applicants were Yale 
treated and how large we might expect any effect to be, we performed a smaller high-level sample of one 
year’s worth of applications, which indicated that 13% of applicants were Yale-treated and we might 
expect a difference of in-hand service rates of around 11%. Therefore, power tests suggested that we 
would need 1,273 observations to find an 11% effect at p = .05 with 80% power. 
130 See Form JD-FM-137, available in the Web Appendix. 
131 We ultimately decided to drop respondent birthdates/ages from our analysis for several reasons. 
First, applicants often (greater than 10% of the time) did not report a birthdate for the respondent at all 
and in multiple other cases only wrote down an age range or a birth year. In addition to the missing 
values, this caused us to question the accuracy of the applicant-reported respondent birthdates for even 
that subset for which we had usable data. This weighed in favor of excluding the variable, especially 
when considering the possibility that including a respondent’s age (in addition to an applicant’s age) 
would make it relatively easier to identify the subjects in certain cases.   
132 The form asked about “sex,” not gender identity, and suggested male and female as the only 
available options. Because of this limitation, our study adopts the same dichotomy.  
133 The application form asks the applicant whether she knows about any previous orders involving 
either her or the respondent. Regardless of her answer, the Clerk’s Office staff will also check for 
previous orders in their internal computer system and add in any missing information that they find before 
giving the file to the judge. 
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(5) whether the applicant is seeking temporary custody or visitation orders; 
(6) whether the applicant is seeking additional orders that are not described 
by the form’s list of pre-drafted orders,134 and (7) whether the respondent is 
eligible to possess a gun, or in fact does possess a gun or ammunition. All 
questions are presumably mandatory for the applicant, except the question 
about gun possession, which is explicitly described as optional. 
From the application form, we also recorded the relationship between 
the applicant and respondent. The application form lists ten possible 
relationship categories covered by the statute and asks the applicant to check 
off all that apply. We generally recorded the relationship categories as the 
applicant wrote them, but, during analysis, grouped these relationship 
descriptors into the exclusive categories of “intimate,” “non-intimate family 
member,” or “non-intimate, non-family member that resides together.”135 
Outside of that process, we created a separate dummy variable for whether 
the applicant reported residing with the respondent. 
The second major component of the TRO application is the affidavit 
form, which asks applicants to describe in their own words why they qualify 
for a TRO. We read each affidavit and coded for the following five factors: 
(1) Did the victim go the hospital as a result of what happened?; (2) Were 
the police involved as a result of what happened?; (3) Did the applicant 
allege that the respondent uses illegal drugs?; (4) Was a weapon used or 
present during the incident?; and (5) Did the applicant allege that the 
respondent sexually assaulted the applicant or the applicant’s minor 
children?136 During our analysis, we summed the total number of factors in 
each affidavit to produce a rough “severity” measure. 
 
134 For example, an applicant might ask for the respondent to refrain from talking about her publicly 
on social media or for the respondent not to contact the applicant’s housemates. 
135 All but three of the cases in our sample with reported relationships fell neatly into these 
categories; one application against a probation officer and two applications against a caretaker were 
treated as missing for the remainder of our analysis. 
136 The vast majority of this coding was personally performed by two authors of this study (Costello 
& Villarreal), as follows. Initially, these two authors coded just under one quarter of the cases 
collaboratively. For the remaining cases, the two authors split up, and each coded approximately half of the 
remaining cases (one author independently coded about 38% of the total applications and 42% of the total 
affidavits and the other author independently coded about 34% and 32%, respectively). Around this same 
time, the authors worked on a coding guide, reproduced in the Web Appendix, which attempted to 
memorialize and standardize coding practices as the authors coded independently. In addition to the two 
authors, two additional coders coded an extremely small fraction of the applications (~3%) and affidavits 
(~1%). As one limited check on how much variability might exist in the coding of these cases, we also had 
a fifth coder code a sample of about 10% of the cases already coded by the primary coders. Back-of-the-
envelope comparisons using that sample and the affidavit factors (which we would expect to vary the most 
across coders) suggest that the new coder agreed with the primary coders over 90% of the time on 
hospitalization, whether drugs were involved, and whether there was a sexual assault, while raw agreement 
on police involvement and weapon use were somewhat lower, at 79.7% and 87.5% respectively. We 
acknowledge that the use of multiple coders, along with our methods for dividing and analyzing the same, 
are limitations of our study. Future studies could improve on our methodology by creating more specific ex 
ante coding criteria, especially for police involvement and weapon use, and by analyzing intercoder 
reliability, including using more sophisticated tests of agreement, across the primary coders themselves. 
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From elsewhere in the file, we recorded which judge decided whether to 
grant ex parte relief and whether the applicant was assisted by a lawyer.  
We next coded for the types of the assistance applicants received and the 
outcomes of their applications, which are summarized in Figure 1.137    
 
 
We see that 6.3% of applicants in our sample were assisted by an 
attorney, implying that over 90% of applicants were pro se. The case file did 
not have sufficient information to consistently convey whether someone had 
a lawyer while they were filing the application. A small number of applicants 
submitted affidavits printed on law firm letterhead. More often, lawyers did 
not appear in the paperwork until a court clerk noted that they attended the 
hearing or there was an attorney appearance filed. We recorded anyone who 
had a lawyer at the hearing as having a lawyer through the process, although 
some applicants may have only hired a lawyer after filing their applications 
pro se. Indeed, in at least a few instances, an applicant went to the Yale TRO 
Project office for assistance without a lawyer and then had a lawyer by the 
 
137 Web Appendix Figure A1 presents additional summary statistics. 
FIGURE 1: SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS  
VARIABLES N MEAN 
   
Treatment   
Likely Represented by Attorney 1243 0.063 
Assisted by Yale 1273 0.131 
Likely Assisted by Quinnipiac 1273 0.571 
   
Order Outcomes   
Fourteen-Day Order 1273 0.509 
Hearing Order 1273 0.397 
Seven-Day Order 1273 0.082 
Order Denied 1273 0.013 
   
Service Outcomes   
In-Hand 1246 0.362 
Abode 1246 0.241 
No Service 1246 0.221 
Not Picked Up 1246 0.096 
Unable to Serve 1246 0.053 
Miscellaneous Served 1246 0.015 
Served to Others 1246 0.013 
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hearing date, either because they obtained a lawyer after visiting the TRO 
Project office, or because they used the TRO Project office in place of their 
attorney to draft the TRO application, for cost or strategic reasons.138  
Finally, from records maintained by the Yale TRO Project, we recorded 
which applicants were assisted by Yale law students. Although Quinnipiac 
law student volunteers do not keep a record of who they assist, we used a 
copy of their schedule and the Yale TRO Project records to construct a 
“likely assisted by Quinnipiac” variable. Based on discussions with the 
Clerk’s Office, we assumed that anyone who was not assisted by Yale 
students on a day that the Quinnipiac students’ office was open was probably 
assisted by Quinnipiac students.139 Over two-thirds of applicants received 
some form of student assistance: 13.1% were assisted by Yale students and 
another 57.1% were likely assisted by Quinnipiac students. Both offices are 
closed for at least a portion of summer- and winter-academic breaks. 
Therefore, Figure 2 presents a histogram of various treatments by filing 
month that shows clear seasonality in student assistance.140  
  
 
138 It is possible, although we think unlikely, that someone had a lawyer to fill out the application but 
not at the hearing. In general, because we sometimes observed an applicant receiving both student and 
attorney assistance, we generally did not treat attorney assistance and student assistance as mutually exclusive. 
Still, we emphasize that attorney involvement occurred very rarely (6.3% of the time) in our dataset. 
139 We believe this is appropriate because Clerks Office staff explained to us that they will send pro 
se applicants to the Quinnipiac students’ office for assistance if the Yale TRO Project office is not open. 
It is possible, of course, that this codes some applicants as assisted by Quinnipiac who do not actually 
receive Quinnipiac assistance. In that case, assuming Quinnipiac treatment had a positive effect relative 
to pro se applicants, our analysis would tend to underestimate the true Quinnipiac treatment effect. Note 
further, as explained earlier, because student assistance and attorney assistance are not mutually 
exclusive, we coded non-Yale applicants on days that Quinnipiac as open as likely assisted by Quinnipiac 
regardless of whether we also found evidence of attorney involvement in a case. 
140 In unreported version of the main regression results that follow, we experimented with using 
monthly fixed effects to capture any seasonal effects on the granting and service of restraining orders. 
We find no evidence of such seasonal effects: an F-test rejects joint significance of the monthly fixed 
effects on both primary outcomes (granting and in-hand service). Of course, filing months are correlated 
with the seasonal timing of student treatment, particularly so as the “Likely Quinnipiac” treatment 
variable is a deterministic function of the application date and the absence of Yale treatment. In the 
extreme, as shown in Figure 2, for eight months in our sample, every applicant that was not assisted by 
Yale was coded as likely assisted by Quinnipiac (with zero non-treated applicants). Obviously, within 
these months there is effectively perfect collinearity between the mutually exclusive Yale and Quinnipiac 
treatments, and within-month treatment effects cannot be estimated. We accordingly chose to exclude 
the fixed effects from the reported regressions to foreclose any collinearity or interpretation concerns. 
Note that when we retained monthly fixed effects, the Yale treatment was significant on in-hand service 
when regressed alongside either the Quinnipiac control or the monthly fixed effects, but not both. 
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 FIGURE 2: LAW STUDENT ASSISTANCE BY MONTH 
 
 
About 60% of applicants were granted ex parte relief: 50.9% received 
ex parte relief and a hearing order in fourteen days; 8.2% received ex parte 
relief and a hearing order in seven days. Almost all of the remaining 
applicants did not receive any ex parte relief but still received an order for a 
hearing to discuss the matter further in fourteen days (39.7%). While Yale-
treated applicants had no differences, on average, in their overall grant rate, 
they had slightly higher rates of seven-day orders and slightly lower rates of 
fourteen-day orders, likely a result of the increased use of the optional gun 
questions by Yale-treated applicants.141 Only 1.3% of applicants had their 
application completely denied. Web Appendix Figure A2(a) shows a relatively 
stable grant rate with a slight increase at the end of the sample period.142 
Overall, service of ex parte orders and hearing orders was poor. Only 
36.2% of all orders (including fourteen-day, seven-day, and hearing order 
only) were delivered in-hand; 143 24.1% were “abode served,” meaning the 
 
141 See Web Appendix Figure A3 for comparisons of Yale-treated applicants to other applicants 
and associated statistical tests. 
142 We believe this is because of a change in staffing in the judges that shifted the overall grant rate 
for the court. 
143 Web Appendix Figure A2(b) shows that the in-hand service rate over time is relatively stable, 
with a slight and gradual dip and recovery throughout 2018.  
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order was left at the respondent’s home address. Of the remaining served 
orders, 1.3% were served to others, like a family member or a guardian, and 
1.5% were some other kind of miscellaneous service, like certified mail.  
Nearly 40% of orders were not served in any manner. A small percentage 
(5.3%) of the time, the marshal reported back that he was unable to serve the 
order. Another 9.6% of the time, the applicant did not pick up the paperwork 
at the Clerk’s Office after it was signed by the judge and therefore never 
gave the order to the marshal. This could either be because the applicant 
could not wait for the judge to rule on the application and never came back 
(the process can take hours), or because the applicant changed her mind about 
going through with the restraining order process. We find that applicants are 
more likely to pick up their orders if they are granted ex parte protection 
than if they are granted a hearing order only,144 likely because applicants 
who know that they are being given a hearing order only and no ex parte 
protection (perhaps because the judge’s clerk told them of the outcome) may 
not want to serve the order without the protection of an ex parte order.  
In nearly one-quarter (22.1%) of the cases, the order was picked up but 
had no return of service nor a notation that a marshal tried but was unable to 
serve the order. This could be because these orders were picked up by the 
applicant but never given to the marshal. As with orders that were not picked 
up, the applicant may have changed her mind about going through with the 
restraining order process, especially if only a hearing order was granted. Or 
some orders may not be given to marshals because of logistical challenges, 
driven by the fact that the burden of providing the orders to the marshals 
falls on the applicants and the marshals are only in the courthouse for limited 
times. Finally, some orders may have been given to a marshal, but the 
marshal never served the order and never reported back that he was unable 
to serve the order. Our inability to differentiate between these reasons for 
lack of service is itself a limitation of Connecticut’s service and data 
collection systems, and the system should be reformed in order to better 
understand why these orders were not served.145 
IV. RESULTS 
In this Part, we present the main results from our study: multivariate 
regression analysis for ex parte order grants and various service outcomes, 
respectively. We conclude this Part by addressing the robustness of our results 
to endogeneity concerns by employing an instrumental variables approach. 
A. Ex Parte Order Grants 
In this section, we present the results of multivariate regression that 
 
144 Web Appendix Figure A9 reports regressions where the outcome is whether an order was picked 
up or not.  
145 See also Tebbs & Tindill, supra note 88. 
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controls for other application-level variables.146 Figure 3 presents the results 
of our ordinary least squares (OLS) models, where the dependent variable 
(outcome) in each column is whether or not an applicant was granted ex 
parte relief (either seven- or fourteen-day).147 Hearing orders and denials of 
applications are both coded as granted=0. Column 1 starts with treatments, 
where attorney appears to be the only significant treatment. Column 2 adds 
demographics, Column 3 adds data from the application forms, Column 4 
adds coded factors from the affidavit, and Column 5 adds judge-fixed 
effects. The applicant’s age is not significant,148 and neither is race.149 Grant 
rates are twenty-nine to thirty-two percentage points higher for female, 
rather than male, applicants, and particularly so when they are filing against 
men. Pairwise tests suggest that the gender effects are driven primarily by 
the gender of the respondent. Filing against men is associated with higher 
grant rates than filing against women, and this effect is indistinguishable 
between male and female applicants. 
  
 
146 We noted during our coding process that some applicants applied for TROs multiple times during 
our study. Some applicants applied against multiple respondents individually. Others were unhappy with 
the outcome of their first application and applied a second time seeking a different result against the same 
respondent. Because the outcomes of these orders are likely correlated in unobservable ways, we 
clustered our regression standard errors at the level of applicant (using applicant birthdate-gender-race 
combinations as proxies for applicant identity). 
147 While our outcome is binary, we choose to use ordinary least squares instead of a binary choice 
model like logit or probit. We do not seek to interpret or use predicted probabilities from our OLS models 
(so the [0,1] bounding issue is not particularly salient), and we later use two-stage least squares, making 
OLS estimates easier to compare with our instrumental variables estimates. For an explanation of the 
harmlessness of using linear probability models, see generally JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN 
PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 94–107, 197–205 (2009). 
In Web Appendix Figure A11 we present, for robustness, logit models with marginal effects for our main 
models. Similarly, logit coefficients were used to construct our Web Widget. 
148 Web Appendix Figure A2C presents a non-parametric regression visualizing the grant rate by 
age, which suggests that there may be especially low grant rates for minors but fairly level grant rates for 
adults. 
149 The Web Appendix presents the full versions of our models in which we modeled various 
combinations of applicant and respondent races. The application form simply asks applicants to report a 
“race” for themselves and for the respondent in an empty box. Many applicants wrote “Hispanic” or 
“Latino.” Therefore, we treated “Hispanic” as its own exclusive category separate from “Black” and 
“white,” and the latter categories may therefore best be interpreted as non-Hispanic White and non-
Hispanic Black (or at least applicants who self-identified as White or Black but did not report whether 
they were Hispanic). These three categories made up the vast majority (~95%) of our dataset. To 
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 FIGURE 3: EX PARTE RELIEF GRANT REGRESSIONS 
 
* Linear probability models; outcome=1 if 7 or 14-day ex parte order is granted, 0 if a hearing 
order only is ordered or the application is denied. Only treatments and statistically significant 
controls reported (see Web Appendix for full table). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered 
by the applicant's birthdate-sex-race. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 










Assisted by Yale -0.036 -0.035 -0.025 -0.042 -0.019 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) 
Likely Assisted by 
Quinnipiac -0.040 -0.021 -0.028 -0.031 -0.016 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
Attorney 0.248*** 0.208*** 0.233*** 0.217*** 0.192*** 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) 
Female Applicant  0.320*** 0.321*** 0.292*** 0.288*** 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) 
Same Sex  0.233*** 0.249*** 0.227*** 0.208*** 
  (0.065) (0.068) (0.067) (0.066) 










  (0.079) (0.080) (0.077) (0.077) 
Family member   -0.091 -0.104* -0.104** 
   (0.055) (0.054) (0.053) 
Roommate   
-
0.132*** -0.109** -0.116** 
   (0.050) (0.048) (0.047) 







   (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) 
Victim went to the 
hospital    0.138*** 0.140*** 
    (0.049) (0.048) 
Police were 
involved    0.144*** 0.147*** 
    (0.028) (0.027) 
Respondent used a 
weapon    0.211*** 0.199*** 
    (0.040) (0.039) 
Judge 2     
-
0.105*** 
     (0.036) 
Judge 3     
-
0.241*** 
     (0.038) 
Judge 4     
-
0.104*** 
     (0.040) 
Judge 6     
-
0.253*** 
     (0.072) 
Other Judge     
-
0.370*** 
     (0.116) 
Observations 1,243 1,203 1,182 1,182 1,182 
R-squared 0.016 0.096 0.122 0.176 0.209 
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 Applicants filing against non-intimate partner non-family members (i.e., 
roommates) are less likely to get ex parte relief relative to those filing against 
intimate partners.150 Applicants who report a related court case are less likely 
to get ex parte relief. Reporting that the respondent caused someone to seek 
treatment at a hospital, that the police were involved, or that the respondent 
had a weapon are associated with higher grant rates, but we do not see any 
effects from reporting drugs or sexual assault (although we have limited 
power for the latter as it is rarely reported). Web Appendix Figure A6 
presents the same results except replaces the specific factors from Columns 
4 and 5 with dummies for the number of total factors in each affidavit. 
Results remain qualitatively similar, and each number of factors is 
associated with a higher grant rate relative to zero factors.151 Figure 4 
visually shows the grant rates by each number of total factors (raw averages, 
not conditional on other variables). We clearly see the importance of 
reporting these factors: the grant rate for those who report even one factor is 
over twenty percentage points higher than that of those who report none.  
  
 
150 More specifically, this difference is significant relative to intimate partners who do not live 
together. The difference between roommates and intimate partners who live together is not statistically 
significant. Family members who do not live together are also less likely to receive orders than intimate 
partners who do not live together. The Web Appendix reports the full versions of this and other figures 
which model various combinations of relationships and residential status and allow for more flexible 
hypothesis testing. 
151 We see some evidence of diminishing marginal returns to additional factors (but note that very 
few applicants reported three or especially four factors).  
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* Grant rates are collapsed by the number of factors present in each application affidavit 
(hospital, police, drugs, weapon, and sexual assault). Standard error bars presented. 
    
Judges are jointly significant as predictors of grant rates. However, each 
judge has a negative coefficient relative to Judge 1, and all but one is 
significant at p<0.01.152 
B. Service Outcomes 
Figure 5 presents similar models as Figure 3,153 but the dependent 
variable is now whether an order (ex parte TRO or hearing order only) is 
served in-hand. The dependent variable equals zero in other cases of service 
 
152 Web Appendix Figure A4 presents cross-tabulations of the grant rate by individual judges. Judge 
grant rates vary from 45% to 70% at the extremes, which are both significantly different from mean 
(59%); judges in the middle are not significantly different from each other. We would expect judge 
caseloads to be fairly similar due to quasi-random assignment (by weekly shifts), suggesting that these 
differences are due to different baseline judge grant rates. Note that we group several very rarely 
appearing judges together in an “other judges” category, which has an even lower grant rate of 29%, but 
only a scant seven observations. In one case we could not identify the judge assigned, which we initially 
coded as its own dummy variable (Judge 9) but did not ultimately include this variable in our analysis as 
it was only associated with one observation. 
153 Unlike Figure 4, Figure 5 stops at Column 4. We do not expect judges to have any direct effect 
on service outcomes (and we do not see any in simple tests of joint significance), and we further argue 
judges should satisfy an exclusion restriction in the next section. See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
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(abode, served on others, or miscellaneous) and in cases of no service.154 
Both Attorney and Yale treatments are significant on the rate of in-hand 
service. The Yale treatments are estimated to increase the likelihood of 
in-hand service between eleven and thirteen percentage points, remaining 
quite stable as controls are added, while the attorney treatment is estimated 
to be between a twenty-two and twenty-eight percentage-point 
enhancement. In subsequent columns, we now also include a dummy for 
whether the order was granted ex parte relief. We see that ex parte orders (as 
compared to hearing orders) are associated with higher in-hand service rates. 
We also see significant racial differences: Black, Hispanic, and other 
applicants tend to receive less in-hand service relative to white applicants.155 
Applicants that report previous orders are less likely to get in-hand 
service,156 while those who request temporary custody are more likely to get 
in-hand service. Applicants who request non-standard relief in the blank box 
are more likely to get in-hand service, which might be a general measure of 
“grit” for applicants determined to get a particular kind of relief. 
  
 
154 For the small fraction (1%) of cases that were denied, the service outcome is coded missing, as 
there was nothing to serve. 
155 Simple cross-tabulations show that white applicants receive in-hand service 48% of the time 
compared with 31%, 34%, and 24% for Black, Hispanic, and other race applicants, respectively. Again, 
the flexible nature of our models (as shown in the Web Appendix) allows us to more closely analyze 
various race combinations and incorporate various controls. More specifically, our results suggest that 
people who are Black, Hispanic, or another race (and are filing against a person of their same race) have 
significantly lower rates of in-hand service relative to a white person filing against another white person. 
This finding is particularly important given that the majority (77%) of applicants in our sample are filing 
against someone of their own race. Digging further, we see somewhat mixed results when trying to 
separate any effect of the applicant’s race from any effect of the respondent’s race, though we caution 
that many race combinations are relatively rare in our sample which limits our statistical power to detect 
differences. At a minimum, we cannot conclude that these differences are driven purely by the race of 
the respondent, as we see evidence that white applicants have significantly higher in-hand service rates 
when filing against Black or Hispanic respondents relative to Black or Hispanic applicants filing against 
someone of their own race. At the same time, though, we also tested whether white applicants had higher 
rates of in-hand service against other race respondents (relative to other race applicants) and whether 
Black and Hispanic applicants had lower rates of in-hand service against white respondents than white 
applicants, without observing any statistically significant differences. We do observe that other race 
applicants have lower rates of in-hand service against white respondents relative to white applicants. 
156 This might indicate a sort of path dependency, where those with previous orders are more likely 
to have external service difficulties that cause them to apply multiple times. 
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FIGURE 5: IN-HAND SERVICE REGRESSIONS 









Assisted by Yale 0.119*** 0.129*** 0.115** 0.112** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) 
Likely Assisted by Quinnipiac -0.003 0.000 0.002 0.001 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Attorney 0.284*** 0.220*** 0.222*** 0.220*** 
 (0.055) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Ex Parte Granted  0.197*** 0.200*** 0.186*** 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
Applicant Age  -0.007* -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Applicant Age Squared  0.000* 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 







  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Hispanic Applicant  -0.105** -0.102** -0.104** 
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 







  (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) 
Different Race * Other Race 
Respondent  -0.175* -0.164 -0.169 
  (0.106) (0.109) (0.110) 
Applicant reported previous 
court orders   -0.077** 
-
0.085*** 
   (0.031) (0.030) 
Request for temporary custody   0.091** 0.092** 
   (0.040) (0.040) 
Request for other orders   0.069** 0.070** 
   (0.034) (0.034) 
Police were involved    0.049* 
    (0.029) 
 
Observations 1,217 1,159 1,157 1,157 
R-squared 0.027 0.093 0.115 0.121 
* Linear probability models are run where the outcome is 1 if the ex parte or hearing order was served 
on the respondent in-hand, and 0 if the order is served in another manner (abode, served on others, or 
other miscellaneous service) or not picked up, not served, or reported unable to serve. Only treatments 
and statistically significant controls are reported (see Web Appendix for full table). Standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered by the applicant's birthdate-sex-race. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 6 presents identical models, except the dependent variable is 
more broadly defined to cover other forms of service. In-hand, abode, or 
other service now all count as served; the variable is coded as zero in cases 
where the order was not picked up, reported no service, or reported unable 
to serve. Attorney treatment effect remains above twenty percentage points 
and remains highly significant (p<.01). But in these specifications the effect 
of Yale law student assistance on this broader measure of service is estimated 
to be seven to nine percentage points and is now only a marginally 
significant treatment (p<.1 and in the first two specifications only). Ex parte 
orders appear more likely to be served (but only 10% significance). “Other” 
race applicants receive lower service, but no differences are observed for 
Black or Hispanic applicants, or different genders.157 Wednesday 
applications are less likely to be served. Affidavit factors do not have any 
effect on service rates; although marshals have access to a copy of the 
application attached to the order, we do not see any evidence that marshals 
are triaging their delivery efforts based on the relative severity of the case.  
 
157 We performed similar tests of race combinations as in footnote 155, supra, but the only 
combinations producing significant results were those involving other (non-Black, non-Hispanic) races 
relative to white applicants. 
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FIGURE 6: SERVICE (OF ANY KIND) REGRESSIONS 
 






Add   
Factors 
      
Assisted by Yale 0.088* 0.091* 0.075 0.074 
 (0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) 
Likely Assisted by 
Quinnipiac 0.034 0.029 0.029 0.029 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 





 (0.038) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) 
Ex Parte Granted  0.057* 0.068** 0.059* 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
Other Race 





  (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) 
Wednesday   -0.105** -0.101** 
   (0.046) (0.047) 
Applicant reported 
previous court 
orders   -0.049 -0.054* 
   (0.031) (0.031) 
Request for 
temporary custody   0.074* 0.073* 
   (0.040) (0.040) 
     
Observations 1,217 1,159 1,157 1,157 
R-squared 0.024 0.041 0.061 0.065 
 
* Linear probability models are run where the outcome is 1 if the ex parte or hearing order 
was served (in any manner), and 0 if not picked up, not served, or reported unable to serve. 
Only treatments & statistically significant controls reported (see Web Appendix for full 
table). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by the applicant’s birthdate-sex-race. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The Web Appendix presents several different variants of the service models 
for robustness. Web Appendix Figure A7 presents identical models, except we 
drop observations with no service. Therefore, these regressions 
compare in-hand service to other forms of service (abode, served on others, and 
miscellaneous). Put another way, these models predict the likelihood of getting 
in-hand service, conditional on getting any service at all.158 Yale treatment, ex 
parte grant, Black and Hispanic parties, and the existence of previous orders 
remain related to in-hand service in the same directions as Figure 5.159 
C. Potential Endogeneity and an Instrumental Variables Approach 
In this Section, we address concerns that two of our main variables of 
interest—ex parte grants and Yale treatment—might be endogenous, and we 
present an instrumental variable approach for robustness. 
First, we might be concerned about endogeneity in the ex parte grant 
variable used in the subsequent service regressions. While we find a positive 
and significant effect of ex parte grant on service outcomes, the 
interpretation of this result is unclear. On the one hand, this might indicate 
that getting an ex parte grant increases your chance of service, perhaps 
because marshals triage and take these orders more seriously. On the other 
hand, there could be no true effect of getting an ex parte grant, and the 
observed differences are driven by unobservable factors. That is, those 
applicants who are likely to get their restraining orders granted are also more 
likely to get them served, perhaps because of increased education, grit, or 
external support. 
 
158 Although we acknowledge that it is econometrically ideal to condition on one outcome and re-
run the regressions, we do this only for robustness purposes after using the entire service outcome dataset 
in Figures 5 and 6 and now present the results in several different combinations to attempt to show the 
complete picture.  
159 Web Appendix Figure A10 presents similar models where in-hand service is now dropped, 
comparing abode and other service to no service. The only consistently significant variables in this model 
are Attorney treatment (positive) and whether the application was filed on Wednesday (negative). Web 
Appendix Figure A9 looks at whether applicants pick up their orders at all (outcome of 1 if order is not 
picked up, 0 if the order is picked up). We interpret coefficients as opposite (i.e., as likelihood of picking 
up). Attorney treated applicants are more likely to pick up, as are those granted ex parte protection and men 
when they are filing against other men. Applicant age is also significant in these models, though the 
significant squared term suggests a quadradic relationship where those who are age forty-five are least likely 
to pick up their orders (a difference of four percentage points compared to applicants who are eighteen or 
sixty-five years old). Visual inspection suggests this relationship is somewhat consistent with the relationship 
we observed in Web Appendix Figure A2(c), where much of the difference is driven by young applicants 
(who in this case are more likely to pick up their orders). Because the normative desirability of not picking 
up differs greatly for ex parte orders and hearing orders (serving the latter may increase danger to the 
applicant relative to the former), we run these regressions both on the full sample and only on the ex parte 
granted subsample. While attorney treatment remains robust, age and gender variables are no longer 
significant when excluding ex parte orders and instead relationships and residential status seem to matter in 
this subset (applicants are more likely to pick up orders involving family members they live with, relative to 
other family members or non-residential intimate partners; the relationship is the opposite for non-residential 
family members compared to non-residential intimate partners). 
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To test these competing explanations, we employ an instrumental 
variables approach. An instrument should be something that is an important 
predictor of ex parte grant rates but is theoretically unrelated to service rates 
(except through grant rates). We use as our instrument the vector of judge 
dummies. We have demonstrated earlier in this Part that judges are an 
important predictor of ex parte grant rates. However, we see no theoretical 
reason to expect that judges matter for service. Judges do not communicate 
with the applicants or marshals between their decision on the ex parte order 
and the hearing, and they are not involved whatsoever with service.160 In 
Web Appendix Figure A8, we employ a two-stage least squares model.161 In 
this model, the instrumented-for ex parte grant status loses its significance 
as a predictor of service. This is consistent with the latter explanation that 
ex parte orders are served at higher rates due to unobservable characteristics 
of their applicants. 
Second, we might be concerned that the Yale treatment is endogenous; 
that is, we might be worried that applications of a different type or quality 
select into Yale treatment. We have articulated strong reasons to doubt such 
bias in the earlier portions of this Article. First, the mechanisms by which 
applicants find themselves at the Yale office should closely approximate 
random assignment on the days that the Yale office is open. Comparing 
applicants assisted by Yale to all other applicants, we find strong evidence 
of balance: none of our pre-treatment variables are statistically different at 
p<.01, only three of twenty-three are different at p<.05, and only three of 
twenty-three are different at p<.1.162 These are the kinds of differences one 
would expect as a matter of chance. Comparing Yale-treated applicants to 
likely Quinnipiac-treated applicants, we are similarly balanced on all 
pre-treatment variables at p<.01, twenty-one of twenty-three pre-treatment 
variables at p<.05, and twenty of twenty-three variables at p<.1. More 
specifically, we are balanced on age, race, and gender of the applicant and 
associated applicant-respondent gender and race combinations, as well as 
most judges and most days of the week. The three exceptions at the 10% 
level are differences in the proportion of applicants that are Yale-treated on 
Tuesdays and Wednesdays163 and a difference in the proportion of 
 
160 We considered the fact that marshals know which judge signed off on each order and might work 
harder for the Presiding Judge, or that they might take orders from judges with low grant rates more 
seriously. However, we see no difference in in-hand service rates between orders issued by the Presiding 
Judge or the judge with the lowest grant rate and other judges. 
161 Indeed, the first stage of this model is simply the earlier grant regression models, on a slightly 
smaller subset of those with non-missing service outcomes. The judge dummies are jointly significant as 
a predictor of grant rates on this sample (robust F(6, 994) = 8.78, p<.001)), though we acknowledge that 
some common rules of thumb would classify this instrument as a weak instrument. 
162 Web Appendix Figure A3 shows a test of balance between applicants assisted by Yale and 
Quinnipiac students, and between those assisted by Yale and the broader group of all other applicants. 
163 This difference is almost certainly driven by the fact that the Yale office was closed every 
Wednesday due to student scheduling issues for one semester in the sample. 
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Yale-treated cases that were decided by Judge 5.164 Taken as a whole, we see 
no evidence from observable characteristics that Yale-treated applicants 
differ systematically from other applicants pre-treatment.165 
However, we do see differences in some of the remaining 
application-level variables in Web Appendix Figure A3. Yale-treated 
applicants are higher in each of the following categories: reporting previous 
court orders, reporting related family court cases, requesting temporary 
custody, requesting other orders, and reporting that they live with the 
respondent. Similarly, Yale-treated applicants have higher reporting rates of 
police involvement and drugs in their affidavits, and generally report greater 
number of severity factors in their affidavits on average (1.10 vs. 0.92). 
While these differences could indicate that the applicants that are 
Yale-treated systematically differ from other applicants, we think that these 
differences are better understood as post-treatment outcomes. That is, one of 
the Yale office’s main goals is to explain the forms to the applicants and 
ensure they are accurately reporting important information.  
We are especially reassured by the balance results when we compare 
them to balance results on attorney treatment, something we might expect to 
be applied systematically. Indeed, attorney-treated applicants differ in five 
pre-treatment variables at the 5% level from non-attorney-treated applicants, 
including that they are significantly less likely to be filing against same-sex 
respondents and are significantly less likely to be Black.166 While this 
somewhat muddies the interpretation of our observed attorney effect 
(because attorneys might be selecting or are being hired by systematically 
different applicants), we do not observe similar race or gender differences 
for Yale-treated applicants. 
Still, it is conceivable that some applicants are bypassing the Quinnipiac 
office for the Yale one, and that those applicants differ in ways that are 
uncaptured by our observable pre-treatment characteristics. To provide 
additional robustness evidence against this conclusion, we again employ an 
 
164 This difference is almost certainly driven by timing. Judge 5 only heard cases in a three-month 
period that coincided well with when the Yale office is open. Judge 5 does not have a significantly 
different grant rate than other judges. 
165 For robustness purposes, we also reran our core regressions in Web Appendix Figure A5 on data 
excluding Tuesday, Wednesday, and Judge 5 observations (representing about 43% of our overall 
sample) and estimated a Yale effect that was similar in terms of sign and significance. 
166 See Web Appendix Figure A3. We also observe that attorney-treated applicants are significantly 
more likely to have their application decided by Judge 2 and significantly less likely to have their 
application decided by Judge 3. The latter judge has the lowest grant rate of the six regular judges in our 
sample, raising some questions of whether attorneys have found a way to strategically file their 
applications to avoid Judge 3 (perhaps by figuring out the schedule pattern through their frequent 
interactions with the system as repeat players). Attorney-treated applicants also differ significantly in 
many other application variables, such as being more likely to report a related case, living with the 
respondent, or a sexual assault. As we have explained earlier, differences in these types of variables could 
indicate effective attorney assistance in preparing the application rather than further reflect systematic 
selection. 
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instrumental variables framework. This time, our instrument is whether the 
Yale TRO office is open on a particular day. The schedule of the Yale TRO 
office is determined by factors that should be unrelated to applicant quality: 
Yale’s start, exams, and break schedule for each semester, student schedules 
and aggregate availability, and how quickly the TRO Project is able to put 
together its trainings and scheduling.167 In one semester, for example, the 
office was forced to close on Wednesdays because student class schedules 
did not line up for enough volunteers to be available on those days. While 
the Yale schedule is seasonal, recall that monthly fixed effect models showed 
no evidence of seasonality on either granting or serving restraining orders.168  
In Web Appendix Figure A8, we employ this instrument by itself and 
alongside the existing instrument for ex parte grants. As expected, Yale 
office open dates are a strong predictor of actual Yale treatment.169 Further, 
the Yale effect retains its sign, significance, and relative magnitude in these 
models. This provides further confidence that our observed Yale treatment 
effects are unlikely to be biased by systematic selection into the Yale office. 
 V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND PROPOSALS170 
We conclude by evaluating the efficacy of the Yale TRO Project’s model 
of scaled-back clerical assistance for TRO applicants and by proposing 
possible reforms to the TRO application process that would reduce granting 
and service hurdles for pro se applicants.  
A. Evaluating Limited Law Student Assistance Programs 
1. Informing Applicants of Salient Factors that Affect Grant Rules 
Neither Yale nor Quinnipiac law student assistance is associated with 
higher ex parte TRO application grant rates. However, Yale law student 
 
167 It is theoretically possible that some applicants strategically select which days they come to the 
courthouse to line up with when the Yale office is open. We suspect that such strategic selection is 
extremely unlikely, in part because the Yale schedule is not easily observable by applicants (likely 
requiring trial and error trips to the courthouse), because the emergency nature of TROs suggest that 
applicants may be harmed by waiting to file their application if the Yale office is not open, especially if 
the Quinnipiac office is open and providing assistance. 
168 Yale schedules are also somewhat determined by holidays; in unreported results we find that a 
rough indicator for major holidays or subsequent business days is not a significant predictor of grant or 
service rates. 
169 This instrument leads to a strong first stage (robust F(1,994)=470.60). Likely Quinnipiac 
treatment (because it is mutually exclusive with Yale treatment) is also a very strong predictor of Yale 
treatment in the first stage. In certain columns of Web Appendix Figure A8 we remove the likely 
Quinnipiac treatment from our in-hand service models for robustness; the Yale treatment effect remains 
virtually identical. 
170 Two of us have separately argued for variants of some of those policy proposals in popular press. 
Ian Ayres & Brendan Costello, Temporary Restraining Orders in Connecticut Don’t Always Take Effect; 
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assistance is associated with a statistically significant increase in the number 
of severity factors the applicant mentions in the affidavit. We believe this is 
because students are encouraging applicants to be more thorough in their 
affidavits by, for example, asking the applicants questions about their 
experiences in a way that reminds them to include that information in their 
affidavits. To the extent permitted by the rules governing unauthorized 
practice, student assistance may be further improved by informing 
applicants of various factors that judges appear to find important in deciding 
whether to grant protection. 
Not all of the severity factors we coded for were associated with 
increased grant rates; however, the applicant going to the hospital, the 
respondent using a weapon, and the police becoming involved all were. 
These severity factors have some support in literature as risk factors for 
femicide, although the academic community has not reached a consensus on 
what factors best predict a respondent’s lethality or overall dangerousness.171 
Specifically, availability of weapons is a factor that appears on several 
well-known lethality assessment scales172 and weapons have been shown to 
be a fairly strong predictor of repeated incidents of physical abuse.173 It is 
therefore logical that judges more often grant applications that mention 
weapons. Access to guns in particular has been associated with a significantly 
increased risk of femicide,174 and studies have associated firearm prohibitions 
for restraining order respondents with a decrease in intimate partner 
homicides.175 However, in our study, judges were no more likely to grant a 
TRO filed by applicants who reported that the respondent had a gun than 
those that did not. Another similar study to ours showed the same result.176   
 
171 Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Daniel Webster, Jane Koziol-McLain, Carolyn Block, Doris Campbell, 
Mary Ann Curry, Faye Gary, Nancy Glass, Judith McFarlane, Carolyn Sachs, Phyllis Sharps, Yvonne 
Ulrich, Susan A. Wilt, Jennifer Manganello, Xiao Xu, Janet Schollenberger, Victoria Frye & Kathryn 
Laughon, Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control 
Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1089 (2003) [hereinafter Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide 
in Abusive Relationships]. 
172 JACQUELYN C. CAMPBELL, DANGER ASSESSMENT, NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 1 (2001), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/DANGERASSESSMENT.pdf [hereinafter CAMPBELL, 
DANGER ASSESSMENT]; BARBARA J. HART, SAFETY FOR WOMEN: MONITORING BATTERERS’ PROGRAMS, 
PA. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 96, 205 (rev. 2004), https://www.biscmi.org/bhart_Safety4W
omen2004.pdf.  
173 Amy E. Bonomi, Britton Trabert, Melissa L. Anderson, Mary A. Kernic & Victoria L. Holt, 
Intimate Partner Violence and Neighborhood Income: A Longitudinal Analysis, 20 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 42, 52 (2014). 
174 Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships, supra note 171, at 1092. 
175 April M. Zeoli & Daniel W. Webster, Effects of Domestic Violence Policies, Alcohol Taxes and 
Police Staffing Levels on Intimate Partner Homicide in Large US Cities, 16 INJ. PREVENTION 90, 90 (2010); 
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Applicants were also more likely to receive a TRO if they mentioned 
police involvement. Police presence has not usually been associated with an 
increased risk of femicide, but it is included in at least one well-known risk 
assessment tool.177 Similarly, applicants going to the hospital for treatment 
was also associated with an increased grant rate in our study but is not 
usually included in risk assessment models. These results may demonstrate 
that judges’ intuitions about what factors increase the risk of future violence 
are not supported by evidence. They may also indicate that judges favor 
cases that have supporting documentation from police or hospitals, even if 
the police and medical records are not included with the TRO application. 
In our study, mentioning the respondent’s drug use was not associated 
with an increase in grant rates. This may have been because of our definition 
of drugs, which incorporates all illegal drugs, including marijuana, but 
excludes alcohol abuse. One well-known lethality risk assessment tool only 
captures the use of “uppers,” therefore excluding marijuana, and includes a 
separate question for alcohol abuse.178 A recent, comprehensive assessment 
of lethality risk factors, however, found that the respondent’s use of illegal 
drugs, and not excessive alcohol use, was associated with femicide, giving 
support to our study’s definition of drug use.179  
We do not observe a significant association between mentioning sexual 
violence and grant rates, though we note that sexual assault is rarely reported 
in our sample, which significantly lowers our power to find any effect. 
However, forced sex is associated with an increased risk of lethality.180 
Judges who evaluated TRO applications should be trained in 
recognizing known risk factors for future violence, which would help them 
apply the law’s requirement that TROs be given to applicants who are in an 
“immediate and present physical danger.”181 Other factors that have been 
identified as increasing the risk of femicide are whether the respondent is 
unemployed, lacks a college education, has ever lived with the applicant, 
recently stopped living with the applicant, abused the applicant during 
pregnancy, stalked the applicant, and lived with a child of the applicant who 
is not also the respondent’s biological child.182 Meanwhile, applicants should 
be informed about the factors that our study found to be associated with 
higher grant rates: presence of a weapon, seeking medical care at a hospital, 
and the presence of police officers during the incident.183 Applicants should 
be aware, however, that informing the court that the respondent has guns 
 
177 Barbara Hart, Assessing Whether Batters Will Kill, PA. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
(1990), https://perma.cc/KH6J-L5QW. 
178 CAMPBELL, DANGER ASSESSMENT, supra note 172, at 1. 
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182 Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships, supra note 171, at 1089–91. 
183 See supra Part III. 
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will force the applicant to serve the respondent in a compressed period of no 
more than seven days from filing.184 
Even if law student assistance does not increase overall grant rates, it 
may have the benefit of sorting meritorious from non-meritorious 
applications earlier in the process. A previous analysis undertaken by 
Ming-Yee Lin, a former TRO Project Director and volunteer, found that 
when looking at applicants who obtained only a hearing order and served it 
in-hand, only 4% of applicants assisted by Yale law students had a judge 
change her mind by subsequently granting protection at the hearing, 
compared with a 17% overall.185 Law student assistance may help applicants 
who meet the statutory criteria receive assistance and prevent respondents 
who do not meet the statutory requirement from having their civil rights 
restricted, in part by encouraging applicants to describe the reasons they are 
applying in more detail than they might otherwise. 
2. Understanding and Replicating Effective Service Treatment 
Although student assistance does not increase grant rates, our evidence 
suggests that Yale student assistance does increase the percentage of orders 
that are served in-hand. We believe this result can be explained by the Yale 
volunteers’ practice of providing information on the service process and its 
importance and then calling applicants to remind them to follow up on 
service. These follow-up calls may be having two different types of effects. 
The first could be encouraging applicants to give orders to a marshal, where 
they otherwise might not, for example, because the marshal was not at the 
courthouse when the application was granted or the applicant did not 
understand the process. The second could be encouraging applicants to 
communicate with the marshal assigned to deliver their order, which could 
increase the rate of service, or at least the rate of in-hand service, by 
marshals. The potential effectiveness of the phone calls on service outcomes 
suggests that limited assistance could take more flexible forms. To the extent 
law student or other programs have limited resources that restrict the ability 
of manning an in-court office, follow-ups on service with existing applicants 
could still be beneficial. Similarly, this result implies that assistance 
provided outside of the courthouse when courthouses are closed or in-person 
interactions are limited, as seen in the COVID-19 pandemic, could still be 
effective in assisting applicants if targeted appropriately. 
3. Other Benefits of Student Assistance 
Still, we caution against interpreting our results to mean that all 
in-person application assistance could or should be replaced with phone 
calls. First, we cannot differentiate what effect phone calls specifically have 
on service outcomes separate from the information provided in the office. 
 
184 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(b) (2019). 
185 Lin, supra note 31, at 10–11. But note that the sample size for this comparison was quite small. 
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Further, there may be other benefits that are not as measurable as grant rates 
or service outcomes, like supporting an applicant emotionally through a 
taxing application process. This kind of support can be especially important 
for people experiencing family violence, since this type of crime was 
handled poorly by the justice system for many years. A lawyer associated 
with the Quinnipiac program endorsed the value of law student volunteers 
by saying that “in most courthouses, you have to shout out the details of your 
life with 50 people in line.”186 Student volunteer offices, like Quinnipiac’s, 
“created a space where you can cry, you can cuss and rant and rave, and no 
one is going to think poorly of you.”187 
The Yale TRO Project’s limited intervention, although effective at 
improving service outcomes for applicants, may be unappealing to law 
schools, which encourage their students to volunteer, in part, for educational 
purposes. Providing clerical assistance and making follow-up calls likely has 
less educational value to law students than representing clients at a hearing, 
where the students can practice interacting with a judge and presenting 
evidence. Government-funded programs, presumably, could be focused 
more exclusively on improving outcomes for applicants without having to 
balance the interests of the workers as highly. Another option would be to 
staff limited-scope programs like the Yale TRO Project with college—not 
law school—volunteers, who would get more educational value out of 
lower-skilled tasks.  
B. Improving Service 
Connecticut’s current statutory scheme permits service in-hand or on the 
respondent’s abode. However, service rates using either of these methods 
are relatively low; over one-third of applications are never served at all.188 
In this Section, we consider various possible improvements to the service 
scheme—in addition to increasing student and related assistance—that may 
increase the TRO service rate. 
Of course, Connecticut—or any other state—is not completely 
unencumbered in setting its service procedures: there are constitutional 
constraints that limit the bounds within which states may tweak their 
processes. The requirement of proper service stems from the Fourteenth 
Amendment right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.189 The right requires courts to give defendants (in this case, 
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respondents) notice and the opportunity to be heard.190 Only after proper 
service may a court exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant.191  
Given this requirement, it is perhaps surprising that Connecticut 
courts—and others throughout the country192—regularly issue ex parte 
TROs that alter the defendant’s rights before he is given an opportunity to 
respond. The issuance of such ex parte orders has been frequently challenged 
on due process grounds across the country, and those challenges have been 
resoundingly rejected.193 In applying a weighing of the interests at stake in 
ex parte TROs, courts have upheld ex parte TRO statutes “when the 
respondent’s deprivations of property or visitation are temporary and subject 
to prompt hearing.”194 This is why each ex parte order is accompanied by an 
order relating to the subsequent hearing that must be served on the respondent. 
The Supreme Court from time to time has critically evaluated the 
constitutional sufficiency of various forms of service. At the heart of 
permissible service is personal service, which “presents the ideal 
circumstance under which to commence legal proceedings . . . .”195 But 
personal service is not the only constitutionally permissible method of 
service. Over time, the Supreme Court has moved from an insistence on 
personal service196 to a recognition that justice sometimes may call for 
alternative forms of service.197 The Court has considered the adequacy of 
such “substituted service” relative to “the traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice implicit in due process.”198 A method of service is 
adequate when it “gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be 
 
190 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
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actual.”199 Put another way, the method of service must provide “notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections.”200  
Importantly, the Court has emphasized that adequacy of service is a 
fact-based determination that hinges on the “realities of the case.”201 That is, 
service that is constitutionally adequate in one case might still fail in another202 
because of differences in either the factual circumstances of service or the 
nature of the interests at stake.203 Further, actual notice, in general, is neither 
a sufficient nor a necessary condition for constitutional protections. That is, 
while service need not provide actual notice to be proper (it must only be 
reasonably calculated to give actual notice),204 cases might be dismissed for 
clearly deficient service even when the defendant has actual notice.205   
In the subsections that follow, we apply these constitutional bounds to 
critically evaluate the legality and effectiveness of Connecticut’s current 
service practices. We present four possible strategies to constitutionally 
increase the rate of effective service of TROs, beginning with the most 
incremental change and progressing to more pronounced changes: 
1. The state should create a service-tracking website to 
increase transparency and self-help for applicants to achieve 
effective service.  
2. Judges should employ carrot-and-stick incentives to 
increase the rates of in-hand service by marshals.  
 
199 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). 
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3. Marshals should increase the use of abode service, 
but only as a substitute for those orders currently going 
completely unserved. 
4. The state should alter its statutorily permissible means 
of service to allow for a belt-and-suspenders system of alternate 
service, including certified mail and cell phone service. 
Importantly, we note that while each proposal would be useful in 
isolation, they are by no means mutually exclusive. Connecticut, or another 
state, could simultaneously replicate the Yale TRO Project’s interventions, 
create a service tracking system, improve in-hand service incentives, 
increase abode service, and adopt a belt-and-suspenders approach. Such a 
combination of reforms, we believe, would provide pro se applicants the best 
chance of achieving effective service. 
1. Create a Public-Facing Service-Tracking Website 
A leading treatise on Connecticut procedure instructs lawyers to 
“monitor the file and make any necessary follow-up phone calls to [e]nsure 
that process has been served.”206 Likewise, the Yale TRO Project allocates 
substantial time and effort for informing the applicants on the procedure for 
service and following up with them by phone to ensure effective service. 
Both interventions are associated with significantly higher rates of in-hand 
service, and attorney treatment is associated with increased service 
overall.207 However, fewer than 10% of applicants are assisted by an 
attorney, and the Yale TRO Project assists only another 13%.208 The 
remaining pro se applicants can be assisted by providing tools tailored at the 
effective mechanisms of attorneys and the Yale TRO Project: information 
and monitoring. 
In particular, much of Yale volunteers’—and presumably attorneys’—
efforts are directed at answering a simple question: whether the restraining 
order was served. Under the current statute, marshals are required to “as 
soon as possible, but not later than two hours after the time that service is 
executed, input into the Judicial Branch’s Internet-based service tracking 
system the date, time and method of service.”209 Even if service was not 
effected prior to the hearing, marshals are required to record that service was 
unsuccessful into the same database.210 However, this database is not 
currently accessible to applicants and their agents. Thus, an applicant may 
be unaware whether service has been effected, even when the court clerk has 
had this information for hours or even days. 
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Instead, applicants are required to expend effort at a time when they are 
undergoing great personal stress to personally contact the marshal to verify 
whether service is effected. Often applicants do not obtain a marshal’s card 
or otherwise record his contact information and are left helpless to verify 
whether service has been effected. This state of uncertainty substantially 
reduces an applicant’s ability to plan for her safety. It also makes it difficult 
for applicants to contact their marshals to ensure effective service, or to work 
with them on an alternate service plan, such as suggesting new locations 
where the respondent might be. Applicants that fare the best, unsurprisingly, 
are those who have assistance from attorneys or law students. It need not be 
this way. A simple solution is obvious: the state should open up its internal 
service tracking database to be public facing. 
Most straightforwardly, a public-facing website would allow applicants 
to get real-time updates on their service status. By inputting identifying 
information, such as their docket number or perhaps their last name and 
birthdate, applicants could check whether service was pending, completed 
abode, or completed in-hand. This website should also provide the name and 
contact information of the marshal handling the applicant’s service. That 
way applicants and their agents (including law students) could track online 
the marshal’s service attempts and contact the marshal to remind him of 
service deadlines or to provide additional information. Providing applicants 
and their agents timely knowledge of abode service might also help them 
establish through respondent texts or emails that the respondent has received 
timely, actual notice. This proposal is not revolutionary or unrealistic: an 
applicant-facing database like this already exists in other states, including 
New York.211 For this website to work best, orders should be entered into it 
as soon as they are given to the marshal, rather than the current system of 
reporting only after service is effected or failed, as described more fully in 
the next subsection. 
2. Improve In-Hand Service 
While both abode and in-hand service are permitted by the current 
statute, there are good practical reasons to prefer in-hand service when 
possible. In-hand service is immune from the kind of collateral attacks that 
lead judges to dismiss cases for insufficient service even when a marshal has 
indicated that abode service has been accomplished.212 As a corollary, it 
ensures that respondents have received actual, timely notice of the hearing 
and a chance to prepare a response. Further, in-hand service allows 
applicants to better safety plan, since they know exactly when the respondent 
received the order, and not just when it was delivered. And being handed an 
 
211 Order of Protection Notification System, NY.GOV, https://oopalert.ny.gov/oopalert/ (last visited 
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212 See TASK FORCE TO STUDY SERVICE OF RESTRAINING ORDERS, supra note 102, at 9–10 
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order in person may have a stronger psychological impact that receiving it 
in the mailbox. However, in-hand service is only accomplished about 
one-third of the time.213 Here, we consider ways to increase the rate of in-hand 
service via on-the-ground changes and altering incentives for marshals. 
There are many barriers that interfere with applicants’ receiving in-hand 
service. Applicants and law student volunteers have complained that some 
marshals do not show up for their assigned shifts on time or at all.214At least 
one marshal has been investigated for refusing to serve orders or becoming 
hostile toward applicants.215 Marshals are subject to regulation by the State 
Marshal Commission for complaints like these.216 
From the marshals’ perspectives, serving TROs is difficult for reasons 
outside of their control. They resent having to come to mandatory shifts at 
the courthouse, and they personally pay for gas to get to the courthouse, even 
though there may be no applicants waiting for them on that day.217 They are 
paid a flat rate of up to $60 for every TRO they serve, plus milage for one 
service attempt, regardless of how many attempts they have to make to serve 
it, so they do not have a large incentive to make multiple service attempts 
when the first one fails, or an incentive to achieve in-hand service if they 
will be paid for abode service the same way.218 There are rumors among the 
bar that private lawyers allegedly avoid this problem by paying marshals a 
$100 fee beyond what the state provides.219 In addition, many marshals 
consider the work dangerous, and if they ask for police backup, they may 
have to spend even more time waiting for assistance for the same flat fee.220 
Many of these problems might be remedied if service was done by state 
employees. Salaried law enforcement officers, like sheriffs or police 
officers, serve restraining orders in the rest of New England and New York 
State.221 Marshals could be paid an annual salary, as opposed charging on a 
per-order basis, which may reduce their incentive to complete service as 
quickly as possible. Another option would be to give service of TROs, but 
not other civil orders, to Connecticut police departments. Police have access 
to motor vehicle databases that can help officers find respondents. In 
addition, police may be better trained and equipped to handle dangerous 
situations. Police may also be more familiar with the community, know more 
about the respondents they are trying to serve, and convey a greater sense of 
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authority to the general public. States may be reluctant, however, to give 
more job responsibilities to police officers, particularly when there are calls 
to “defund” police departments and shift officers’ job responsibilities to 
others. This job function need not be given to police officers specifically as 
long as the people serving the orders had similar oversight and training in 
de-escalation, and they did not have the same incentive problems 
independent contractors have. 
Even if marshals continue to work as independent contractors, we 
propose several carrots and sticks that could improve their rates of in-hand 
service. First, a carrot: as described above, marshals are paid one fixed fee 
for service of an order, whether abode or in-hand. We propose changing the 
fee structure to pay more for in-hand service than abode service. This could 
be accomplished by either raising the payment for in-hand service above its 
current level, capping reimbursements for abode service at a fraction of the 
payment for in-hand service, or both. 
Next, the sticks: a simple change to the existing service-tracking 
database could hold marshals more accountable. Currently the statute only 
requires marshals to input information once service has been completed, or 
in advance of the hearing if service had not been completed.222 That is, there 
is no centralized record of which marshal has been assigned to which 
restraining order until the marshal returns a receipt of service to the court. 
More than a fifth, or 22%, of orders never have a return of service entered,223 
meaning that some marshals could be regularly failing to serve restraining 
orders without the Marshal Commission’s knowledge. However, as noted 
earlier, it is also possible that many of these orders are never provided to a 
marshal at all. Better tracking when orders are provided to marshals should 
also be in the marshals’ interest, as we could clearly identify the portion of 
unserved orders that they were never given to serve. Earlier reporting and 
better data collection would show whether the broken link in the chain is 
predominantly a failure of orders to be given to marshals, rather than any 
failure on the marshals’ part to serve and report on orders they were given. 
As one straightforward option, the burden could shift away from 
applicants to provide orders to a marshal directly, perhaps by having the 
clerk give orders directly to the marshals.224 If this approach is adopted, the 
Clerk’s Office should be trained to encourage applicants to fill out the 
Protection Order Service Respondent Profile Form as fully as possible, since 
the marshals will not be able to ask applicants follow-up questions in person. 
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Alternatively, or in addition, the Clerk’s Office should make sure applicants 
are leaving working phone numbers so that marshals can call them with 
questions and updates.225 Because of the on-going COVID-19 pandemic, the 
organization CT Safe Connect is currently serving as an intermediary 
between applicants and marshals.226 The state should study how that system 
worked and whether it should be extended. Even if the system reverts back 
to its usual structure post-pandemic, with applicants handing orders to a 
marshal at the courthouse, we propose requiring the Clerk’s Office to enter 
into the system the marshal’s name associated with a particular order as soon 
as a marshal is assigned. This change would provide valuable information 
on the nearly one-fourth of applications with missing service data.227 Then, 
administrators and applicants would know for every order that was not 
served, whether the order was given to a marshal, and if so, which one. 
This information could be coupled with a variety of sticks. The complete 
dataset would allow for comparing each marshal to the average of other 
marshals assigned to that courthouse. Because marshals are regularly rotated 
on the on-call schedule, over large periods of time we would expect that the 
orders assigned to a particular marshal would be no more difficult to serve 
than those assigned to any other marshal. Rates of service failure that are 
substantially higher than average—or a substantially higher fraction of 
orders that are served abode versus in-hand—could indicate that a marshal 
is doing less than his best in serving these orders. The most straightforward 
consequence is already available: discipline by the Marshal Commission. 
State law provides that the Marshal Commission “shall . . . ensure that such 
restraining orders are served expeditiously,” and “[f]ailure of any state 
marshal to accept for service any restraining order assigned by the 
commission or to serve such restraining order expeditiously without good 
cause shall be sufficient for the convening of a hearing for removal.”228  
Further, in addition to internal sanctions by the Marshal Commission, 
judges could take a more active role in investigating service issues. For 
example, judges could adopt a policy of subpoenaing the marshal assigned 
in a random selection of cases with no service or abode service, to inquire 
why in-hand service could not be accomplished. Or judges could use this 
remedy only when the modified internal database suggests a repeat problem. 
3. Abode Service as a Substitute for No Service 
For the reasons cited above, in-hand service should be preferred to abode 
service where both methods are possible. However, abode service is still 
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expressly permitted by the statute, and nearly one-third of orders are never 
served at all. Even substituting abode service for those cases where no 
service is currently accomplished would be a substantial improvement.  
As a threshold matter, we ask whether abode service of TROs is 
constitutionally sufficient. Unlike abode service under the federal rules, 
which contemplates the summons be physically given to someone at the 
residence,229 Connecticut’s service statute merely requires that marshals 
“leav[e] an attested copy at [the respondent’s] usual place of abode.”230 This 
method of service is similar to service by “posting” a summons at a 
residence, which has been scrutinized in several cases. Most notably, the 
issue of whether posting was sufficient was tackled head-on by the Supreme 
Court in Greene v. Lindsey.231 There, the Court simultaneously “established 
the general permissibility of posting,” while “strik[ing] it down as 
unconstitutional ‘in the circumstances of this case.’”232 
In Greene, officers affixed a notice of eviction to the doors of tenants’ 
apartments as provided under Kentucky law.233 The Court took notice of the 
fact that the abode service was of an action concerning the abode:  
[w]ith respect to claims affecting the continued possession of 
that residence, . . . [the tenant] might reasonably be expected 
to frequent the premises; if he no longer occupies the premises, 
then the injury that might result from his not having received 
actual notice as a consequence of the posted notice is reduced.234  
In effect, the Court found that the method of service was particularly apt 
given the interest in the case and considered the degree of the injury from 
failed notice under the method of service. Still, however, the Court showed 
that the facts and circumstances of each case can overcome a presumption 
of valid abode service. In rejecting the service as constitutionally adequate 
in this case, the Court stressed that “process servers were well aware [that] 
notices posted on apartment doors in the area where these tenants lived were 
‘not infrequently’ removed by children or other tenants before they could 
have their intended effect.”235 
 
229 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(B) (permitting service by “leaving a copy of [the summons and 
complaint] at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and 
discretion who resides there”). 
230 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-54 (2019). Note the additional requirement that “[w]hen service is made 
by leaving an attested copy at the defendant’s usual place of abode, the officer making service shall note 
in his return the address at which such attested copy was left.” Id. 
231 456 U.S. 444 (1982). 
232 Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Postman Never Rings Twice: The Constitutionality of Service of 
Process by Posting After Greene v. Lindsey, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 601, 620 (1984) (citing Greene, 456 U.S. 
at 453). 
233 Greene, 456 U.S. at 446. 
234 Id. at 452. 
235 Id. at 453. 
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To further support its reasoning, the Court held that “reasonableness of 
the notice provided must be tested with reference to the existence of ‘feasible 
and customary’ alternatives . . . .”236 While the Kentucky statute required one 
attempt at personal service prior to posting—the Connecticut statute does 
not—the Greene Court noted disapprovingly that a first attempt fails “in a 
‘good percentage’ of cases” but “[n]either the statute, nor the practice of the 
process servers, makes provision for even a second attempt at personal service 
. . . .”237 “The failure to effect personal service on the first visit,” the Court 
admonished, “hardly suggests that the tenant has abandoned his interest in the 
apartment such that mere pro forma notice might be held constitutionally 
adequate.”238 In concluding, the Court hints at a way that abode service in 
this case could have been sufficient: the use of concurrent mail service.239 
While conceding that service by mail is “far from the ideal[,]”240 the Court 
had “no hesitation in concluding that posted service accompanied by mail 
service, is constitutionally preferable to posted service alone.”241 
In light of Greene, Connecticut’s practice of serving TROs by leaving 
them at the respondent’s abode—without more—is of questionable 
constitutional sufficiency242 and ripe for due process challenges depending 
on the facts and circumstances of each case. The interests involved are 
similar: the Court in Greene stressed that the respondents whose eviction 
notices were served by posting had property interests in their homes at 
stake;243 restraining order respondents may also lose the ability to stay in 
their homes, in addition to other restrictions on their freedom of 
movement.244 And the facts of the case may present similar issues to Greene, 
such as an area known for having postings removed.245 In fact, the case in 
Greene had an additional indicium of reliability that many TROs lack: the 
fact that these were eviction proceedings at least ensured that the 
respondent’s address was correct. Courts weighing sufficiency of abode 
 
236 Id. at 454. 
237 Id. 
238 Id.  
239 Id. at 455. 
240 Id. at n.9. The dissent further strongly disagrees with the suggestion of mail service due to “loss, 
misdelivery, lengthy delay, or theft.” Id. at 460 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
241 Id. at 455 n.9 (majority opinion). 
242 Indeed, one article explicitly lists the Connecticut abode service statute, along with two other 
states, as one that “require[s] further examination after Greene.” Greenbaum, supra note 232, at 626–27. 
But see Arms v. Gibbs, No. SPNH 8303-3907, 1983 WL 187768 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 3, 1983) 
(unpublished) (rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of abode service shortly after Greene and citing 
the same, despite statistics presented by Yale Law School students showing a discrepancy in the rates of 
judgment for failure to appear between abode service and personal service); Smith v. Smith, 183 A.2d 
848, (Conn. 1962) (concluding, prior to Greene, that abode service was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, 
at least in circumstances where the defendant was served at his abode and provided actual notice by a 
phone call from his daughter about the papers being delivered to his home). 
243 Greene, 456 U.S. at 450–51. 
244 See Taub, supra note 89, at 103–06. 
245 Greene, 456 U.S. at 453. 
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service in TRO hearings must further wrestle with the possibility that the 
applicant provided an address that was incorrect. 
Therefore, it is of little surprise that abode service in Connecticut is 
considered easily challenged in general246 and that judges often dismiss TRO 
cases specifically where only abode service was accomplished.247 Still, this 
does not mean that abode service can never be constitutionally sufficient, or 
that it will not provide the applicant with effective protection in many cases. 
Most notably, applicants often show up to a hearing after having been abode 
served and effectively waive any challenges they may have had to proper 
service.248 In this way, abode service often furthers the applicants’ goal: 
allowing the proceedings to go forward. 
Even when the respondent does not show up (or does not waive any 
challenges to quality of service), there is no bright-line rule for assessing the 
permissibility of abode service. Case law directs judges to consider the facts 
and circumstances of the case to determine whether due process was 
satisfied.249 Judges may be more willing to accept a record of abode service 
as sufficient if, for example, the applicant can present other evidence (such 
as a text message or testimony) showing when the respondent received 
timely notice of the order.250 Thus abode service can be strengthened if 
applicants are able to provide additional evidence to satisfy the court that the 
abode service in that case was reasonably calculated to provide actual notice 
of the action. Applicants should be informed, perhaps on the marshal 
information form or the TRO itself, of the importance of gathering this 
additional information, and those assisting them (including law student 
volunteers) should stress this point.  
Perhaps most straightforwardly, the likelihood that a court will accept 
abode service can be strengthened by borrowing the Supreme Court’s 
suggestion in Greene. Marshals, the court clerk, or perhaps even the 
applicants themselves could easily and cheaply mail a copy of the order 
whenever the service the marshal provided was only abode service.251 Or, 
this could be done as a matter of course in all cases, a belt-and-suspenders 
approach that we explore further in Section V.B.4, infra. 
In sum, if many of the cases where return of service was missing were 
provided at least abode service, perhaps accompanied by mail service, a 
substantial fraction of respondents who currently go unserved would likely 
appear in court and, either via waiver or timeliness evidence, be subject to 
 
246 1 DUPONT ON CONNECTICUT CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 91, at § 8-1.24. 
247 TASK FORCE TO STUDY SERVICE OF RESTRAINING ORDERS, supra note 102, at 9–10. 
248 Id. at 10. 
249 See Greene, 456 U.S. at 449–50.  
250 Interview with Judge Erika M. Tindill, supra note 104. 
251 Cf. Arms v. Gibbs, No. SPNH 8303-3907, 1983 WL 187768, *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 3, 1983) 
(unpublished) (declining the defendant’s request to require mailing in conjunction with abode service on 
the grounds that this was not required to make abode service constitutionally sufficient). Again, reliable 
tracking of any mailed order is important for the applicant’s ability to plan for her safety. 
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the court’s jurisdiction. In fact, service in New Haven already seems to be 
moving in that direction. When Ming-Yee Lin analyzed TRO applications in 
2013, only 7% of all orders were being abode served, compared with 41% 
receiving in-hand service.252 In our study, 24% of orders were abode served, 
suggesting that this increase in orders abode service may have come in part 
at the expense of in-hand service. 
If a policy encouraging abode service were to be implemented, it should 
be done in a way that does not encourage marshals to complete in-hand 
service less often, for all the reasons we have articulated earlier that suggest 
in-hand service is preferable.  
To ensure that enhanced abode service does not further come at the 
expense of in-hand service, the Marshal Commission and judges could use 
the enhanced service-tracking system proposed earlier. This system would 
provide real-time data on whether increases in abode service are increasing 
overall service rates or are instead coming at the expense of decreased 
in-hand service rates. 
4. Certified Mail or Cell Phone Service: A Belt-and-Suspenders 
Approach 
The three previous proposals are aimed at improving service rates on the 
ground, while still operating within the current statutory framework of abode 
and in-hand service. Now we ask whether this framework can be expanded 
to provide alternate methods of permissible service. We propose additional 
forms of service not to necessarily replace abode or in-hand service, but in 
the form of a belt-and-suspenders approach. Here, we first consider the legal 
sufficiency and potential efficacy of two alternative methods of service: 
certified mail and cell phone service. Then we consider the possible logistics 
of a belt-and-suspenders approach. 
First, we consider service through certified mail. In fact, service by mail 
is the only exception to abode or in-hand service currently contemplated by 
the restraining order statute.253 This exception is limited to the case where 
an applicant is seeking an extension of an existing order, and the respondent 
did not previously make an appearance.254 We propose extending mail 
service beyond this narrow exception to allow certified mail service of the 
original ex parte order and notice of hearing. 
To be sure, such a change would require legislative amendment. Under 
the current statutory scheme, service of process must be accomplished by a 
“proper officer,” which would presumably exclude a postal worker.255 We 
 
252 Lin, supra note 31, at 12. Back-of-the-envelope adjustments to make our numbers more directly 
comparable and tests of statistical equality continue to suggest large differences in these service rates 
since 2013.  
253 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15(g) (2019). Note that this exception actually allows service by first-
class mail, while we propose certified mail for serving the ex parte order and notice of hearing. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. § 46b-15(h)(2). 
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note, however, that the general civil process statute allows service by 
certified mail for nonresidents located out of state.256 
Such a change would also need to be evaluated to ensure it comported 
with the constitutional boundaries set out above. Mail service as a general 
matter has long been discussed favorably by the Supreme Court257 and has 
been interpreted to be “the minimum notice constitutionally required.”258 
Still, there exists some debate over whether service by standard, first-class 
mail is sufficient, or whether an enhanced form of mail with signature or 
receipt confirmation is required.259 In any case, our proposal sidesteps this 
issue by focusing on certified mail, the strongest form of mail service, which 
both requires a signature and returns a receipt of delivery, and by considering 
certified mail in a belt-and-suspenders system, rather than proposing a pure 
mail service system.260  
In addition to or instead of certified mail, a similar approach could be 
accomplished via “cell phone service.” Under this approach, a respondent 
would be notified of a pending ex parte restraining order or hearing order by 
a text message to his cell phone. He could then click a link to receive more 
information about the order on a website, which could be a subpage of the 
tracking website described above. By visiting and entering in identifying 
information on the site, this notification could also serve as evidence of 
notice to the respondent. Like certified mail, this method would also likely 
require legislative amendment to the Connecticut service of process statute.261  
Like certified mail service, cell phone service must be critically 
evaluated to determine whether it provides constitutionally valid due process 
to respondents. We are not the first to ask this question. As the internet and 
electronic communication has become increasingly ubiquitous over the past 
several decades, scholars have begun to consider the ways that traditional 
service methods can be constitutional and be made electronic.262 While some 
 
256 Id. § 52-59b(c) (in conjunction with service on the Secretary of State and assuming personal 
jurisdiction is satisfied). 
257 See, e.g., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982) (describing mail as efficient, inexpensive, 
and relied upon by “prudent men” conducting “important affairs”); Greenbaum, supra note 232, at 623 
(“The Court’s infatuation with service by mail is long standing and often expressed.”). 
258 Greenbaum, supra note 232, at 624. 
259 Id. at n.143 (citing differences across lower courts and commentators on the type of mail service 
required). 
260 Cf. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308 (McKinney 2010) (allowing, where service by preferred methods 
“cannot be made with due diligence,” a combined method of “affixing the summons to the door of . . . 
[the] usual place of abode . . . and by either mailing the summons to such person at his or her last known 
residence or by mailing the summons by first class mail to the person to be served at his or her actual 
place of business.”  
261 Rather than make specific allowances for certified mail or text message service, Connecticut 
could follow New York’s lead, which expressly permits courts to direct alternative methods of service if 
personal service is impractical. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308 (McKinney 2010) (allowing service “in such 
manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs, if service is impracticable under [other 
traditional methods].” 
262 Cantor, supra note 191, at 964–65.  
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have argued that electronic service violates due process,263 the emerging 
consensus appears to be that electronic service—if done properly—can 
constitutionally substitute for traditional methods.264 And while the 
Connecticut Supreme Court has recently held that fax constitutes “personal 
delivery,” at least for the limited purpose of timely delivering process from 
a plaintiff to a marshal, several Justices wrote in dissent, in part to “note that 
several courts and scholars have raised various concerns about electronic 
service, including the problem of verifying whether and when such 
communications were opened or viewed.”265 We are mindful of these 
concerns in the design of the system that we propose. 
To justify the constitutional merit of electronic service, commentators 
have argued that, under the proper circumstances, e-mail is “reasonably 
calculated” to notify the defendant of the pending action.266 In fact, because 
of the ubiquity, reliability, and speed of e-mail, it might even be better 
calculated to provide notice to the defendant than other traditional methods 
of service. An e-mail will reach the defendant instantly, “whereas a piece of 
‘first class’ mail may sit unread in a defendant’s mailbox for days while the 
defendant is out of town, or a process server may be unable to locate a 
defendant.”267 Some jurisdictions may have started to warm up to the 
academy’s suggestion by creating rules that could allow electronic service 
in at least some circumstances.268 
While most of the literature focuses on service by e-mail,269 and we are 
open to such e-mail service in the context of TROs, we choose to instead 
focus on cell phone service because of the realities of the interactions 
between applicants and respondents. Abuse often comes with harassment by 
text messages or phone calls. Indeed, in our experience, applicants nearly 
always have the respondent’s cell phone number, even in cases where the 
applicant does not know the respondent’s current address. While of course 
 
263 See, e.g., Matthew R. Schreck, Preventing “You’ve Got Mail”™ from Meaning “You’ve Been 
Served”: How Service of Process by E-Mail Does Not Meet Constitutional Procedural Due Process 
Requirements, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1121, 1142–45 (2005). 
264 See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 191, at 963–67; John M. Murphy III, Note, From Snail Mail to E-
mail: The Steady Evolution of Service of Process, 19 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 73, 110 (2004); Jeremy A. 
Colby, You’ve Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic Service of Process, 51 BUFF. 
L. REV. 337, 372–81 (2003). 
265 Johnson v. Preleski, 229 A.3d 97, 99, 115 (Conn. 2020) (McDonald, J., joined by Mullins and 
Kahn, JJ., dissenting). 
266 Cantor, supra note 191, at 963–64. 
267 Id. at 965. 
268 Claire M. Specht, Note, Text Message Service of Process—No LOL Matter: Does Text Message 
Service of Process Comport with Due Process?, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1929, 1948–49 (2012). 
269 See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 191 (discussing internet service and concentrating on email service 
specifically); Colby, supra note 264 (discussing primarily email but also facsimile and other electronic 
communication methods); Murphy, supra note 264 (discussing email service and technological 
predecessors). But see Specht, supra note 268, at 1929 (considering cell phone service and concluding 
that it is not per se unconstitutional, but that technological limitations may counsel against cell phone 
service).  
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this method comes with potential limitations, such as changed or 
disconnected phone numbers, we believe cell phone service to the phone 
number the respondent is using to communicate with the applicant is 
reasonably calculated to provide the respondent with notice of the action.   
While the idea of cell phone service has been criticized for being (1) 
informal, (2) lacking confirmation of receipt, and (3) its inability to include 
documents,270 our proposed operationalization of cell phone service avoids 
these hurdles by combining a text message with an internet database. The 
cell phone text would link the respondent to the website portal page, which 
would appear more formal, could confirm the time that the respondent 
followed the link, and could easily include documents such as a scanned 
copy of the ex parte order and summons.  
Assuming that either certified mail or cell phone service may be 
constitutionally permissible, we now consider how and when they should be 
used. A belt-and-suspenders approach could be structured in three ways: (1) 
mail and cell phone service could be used as a first-line attempt, with 
traditional service only if they fail; (2) mail and cell phone service could be 
used concurrently with traditional service for redundancy; or (3) mail and 
cell phone service could be used as a backup if traditional methods fail.  
Using these alternative methods as a first-line approach is tempting from 
a cost and efficiency perspective: either certified mail or text messages are 
less expensive than service by a marshal and could be done automatically by 
staff at the Clerk’s Office. The Clerk’s Office could adopt a system, for 
example, in which they automatically send out all orders via certified mail 
or text message. USPS could email back the Clerk’s Office with a signed 
return receipt. If the Clerk’s Office fails to get back the return receipt within 
forty-eight hours, then it could hire marshals to try to achieve in-hand service.  
However, we believe that a first-line approach would be mistaken, as 
certified mail and cell phone service are not perfect substitutes for in-hand 
service. Unlike in-hand service, which quells any doubt about adequate 
service, either alternative method could still be open to collateral attacks. 
Further, in-hand service provides other non-notice benefits to applicants. 
Most notably, in-hand service appears to provide the greatest likelihood that 
prosecutors will move forward with a criminal action to enforce the order if 
it is violated. Prosecutors may decline to enforce orders that were only 
served by mail or by cell phone, similar to their hesitance to enforce 
abode-served orders today.271 In addition, we have heard some reports that 
some marshals take the time to explain what the order means and emphasize 
to the respondent that he must comply with its provisions, which a postal 
worker would not be able to do. Finally, in-hand service (if there is a good 
working relationship between the applicant and the marshal) allows for the 
 
270 Specht, supra note 268, at 1955. 
271 See supra note 102 and accompanying text (describing the findings of a state task force). 
 
2021]  IMPACT OF STUDENT ASSISTANCE ON TROS 293 
best safety planning by applicants, relative to certified mail or text messages, 
which could be delivered at unpredictable times. 
That said, we strongly support a belt-and-suspenders approach where 
certified mail or cell phone service would be attempted simultaneously with 
traditional marshal service, or as a backup if marshal service fails. As both 
methods of alternative service are inexpensive and simple, they would add 
little marginal cost to the cost of serving each order. The marginal benefits, 
however, may be substantial. In cases where marshal service fails 
completely, certified mail or cell phone service may succeed and be 
recognized by the court as sufficient service on its own. Or, in the many 
cases where marshals are only accomplishing abode service, mail or cell 
phone service might encourage applicants to appear at the hearing and waive 
service requirements. At a minimum, it would ensure that the service has an 
additional indicium of reliability to convince the trial judge that due process 
has been satisfied in this case. 
C. Other Reform Suggestions 
The focus of this study is the effect of student assistance and various 
service hurdles faced by pro se applicants. Still, in coding over one thousand 
TRO applications by hand, we noticed several additional trends in 
application grants that are worth mentioning. In the remaining subsections, 
we highlight three aspects of the TRO application process that are ripe for 
future study and reform. 
1. Variation in Grant Rates Across Judges 
Grant rates among judges varied considerably, from 45% to 70% at the 
extremes. This suggests that similar applicants may receive very different 
outcomes depending on which judge handles their order. As one idea, social 
science research suggests that providing judges with information on grant 
rates could reduce disparities in outcomes.272  
2. Firearm Restrictions 
In many states, firearm restrictions are poorly enforced. In 2005, for 
example, a report to the California Attorney General found that no law 
enforcement agency in the counties studied had a procedure in place to 
consistently remove guns from restraining order respondents, even though 
respondents were required to turn in their guns.273 Recall that under the 
legislative change Connecticut made in 2016, applications that report guns 
 
272 See psychologist Solomon Asch’s famous conformity experiments, Solomon E. Asch, Studies 
of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCH. 
MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED 1, 2, 70 (1956), which showed that a large minority of people will 
answer an obvious question incorrectly if everyone else in the group does so as well. 
273 Paul L. Seave, Disarming Batterers Through Restraining Orders: The Promise and the Reality 
in California, 30 EVALUATION REV. 245, 245–47, 261–64 (2006).  
 
294 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:2 
require a compressed time to serve the order, raising the chance that the order 
is not served at all, under the theory that respondents are being deprived of 
their guns during that period. Conversations with people involved with the 
restraining order system in Connecticut suggest that the state may be 
struggling with similar enforcement issues. One of us has argued elsewhere 
that states should move beyond the “honor system” and proactively move to 
disarm firearm licensees who are prohibited from possessing guns.274  
CONCLUSION 
Large-scale but limited-scope interventions in domestic violence law are 
promising, although their effects may be limited. In this study, we found that 
law student assistance is not associated with increased or decreased grant 
rates of restraining orders. However, law student assistance does appear to 
play an important and effective role in improving service, which is one of 
the largest hurdles for pro se applicants. Insight from this study can be used 
to make sure these interventions, which are likely to continue, work as 
effectively as possible. 
 
274 See generally IAN AYRES & FREDRICK E. VARS, WEAPON OF CHOICE (2020) (arguing that states 
enact unlawful possession petition process authorizing courts to order disarming people who are 
prohibited from owning firearms). 
